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A Proposal for Federal Legislation to
Address Health Insurance
Coverage for Experimental and
Investigational Treatments
SHARONA HOFFMAN*
" Benefits are not provided for services and supplies . . .
[t]hat are investigational or experimental .... '" Such
exclusionary language appears in many health insurance benefits
plans and has caused a plethora of controversy, consternation,
and litigation in recent years. It is difficult to imagine the devas-
tation felt by a critically ill patient who learns of a potentially life
saving treatment but is denied insurance coverage because the
health benefits provider determines that the treatment is experi-
mental or investigational.
A 1991 Gallup poll of oncologists found that one out of eight
patients never received their physicians' preferred treatment be-
cause of "reimbursement struggles.'? A current poll, conducted
in the era of managed care, would likely yield even more dra-
matic data. The husband of a breast cancer patient articulated
his family's anguish as follows:
I am involved in a legal battle with Blue Cross and Blue Shield
... which has denied coverage for my wife's bone marrow
transplant for advanced breast cancer. . . . Now, when we
need insurance the most, Blue Cross has turned its back on us.
Unless the case is settled soon in our favor, I will be forced
* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
B.A., Wellesley College (1985): J.D., Harvard Law School (1985): LL.M., University
of Houston Health Law and Policy Institute (1999). The author wishes to thank Wil-
liam Winslade, Mark A. Rothstein, and Seth Chandler for reviewing drafts of this
Article and providing insightful comments. This Article was made possible in part
by a grant from the AAUW Educational Foundation.
'Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 1993).
2 Richard S. Saver, Note, Reimbursing New Technologies: Why Are the Courts
Judging Experimental Medicine", 44 STAN. L. REv. 1095, 1105-06 (1992).
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to sell my house, borrow from friends and relatives, and mort-
gage my children's future. Blue Cross's position has created a
huge financial, emotional and physical burden for my WIfe,my
family and me.'
Often, patients turn to the courts, asking judges to determine
whether insurance companies should be forced to pay for experi-
mental and investigational treatments. Judges hearing these
cases are keenly cognizant of the gravity of the decisions before
them. They are aware that they perhaps hold in their hands a
patient's last hope for treatment and thus survival. As one judge
confronted with this dilemma stated:
I was called upon to decide whether eight year old Tishna
Rollo could live or whether she must die, a humbling and so-
bering decision. Tishna, Iwas told, had virtuaUyno chance of
surviving the relapsed Wilms' tumor from which she is suffer-
ing and Blue CrosslBlue Shield had denied coverage for autol-
ogous bone marrow transplant ("ABMT") with accompanying
high dose chemotherapy, a treatment which could weUpro-
long and quite possibly save her life and which, concededly,
provided her only realistic hope of either ....
The bottom line, as this case began, was that Blue Cross!
Blue Shield would have to defend their decision denying cov-
erage and, if they successfully did so, this child would most
likely die, a victory which would give even the victor little
satisfaction."
Faced with such emotionally charged cases, courts have
reached contradictory and inconsistent conclusions." Courts
have been criticized for ordering payment for experimental treat-
ment too frequently based on compassion rather than the merits
of the case. Some commentators have suggested that the judici-
ary should not be involved in making such determinations at all."
Moreover, many critically ill patients do not have the financial
resources, energy, or time to endure a court battle."
3 Robert Russo, I'll Have to Sell the House to Pay for Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
5, t994, at A20 (letterto editor).
4 Rollo v. Blue CrossIBlue Shield, No. ClV.A.90-597, 1990 WL 312647, at *1
(D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990) (statements of the district court judge).
51. Gregory Lahr, Commentary, What is the Method to Their "Madness?" Experi-
mental Treatment Exclusions in Health Insurance Policies, 13 J. CONTE.l\tlP. HEALTH
L. & POL'y 613, 623 (1997); Saver, supra note 2.
6Lahr, supra note 5, at 623-24.
7 See Jennifer L. Hardester, Note, In Furtherance of an Equitable, Consistent
Structure for Reviewing Experimental Coverage Decisions: the Lessons of Pitman v.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Oklahoma, 14 ST.LOUISU. PUB.L. REV.289 (1994).
The article relates the story of Donna Rogers, a breast cancer patient, who filed suit
'.'-. . . .. ~ '" .w'~. ,~"i""'" • ~' ..., _' •. " ~ ,'~,. :! ,,~~O".. , ..'...... .' 'j. ,\I' '"
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Some state legislatures have responded to the growing contro-
versy regarding health benefits coverage for experimental and in-
vestigational treatments. Several states have mandated that
insurance companies pay for high dose chemotherapy with bone
marrow transplants for certain kinds of cancer under particular
circumstances." Other states have provided that insurance com-
panies must at least offer coverage for high dose chemotherapy
with bone marrow transplants."
State legislation that focuses on a particular treatment for a
specific disease, however, is problematic for a number of reasons.
First, narrowly tailored statutes affect only a small number of pa-
tients who need the therapy at issue and live in the specified
state.'? Second, state legislation targeting particular treatments
may result from lobbying efforts of interest groups 11 or from indi-
vidual, high profile cases." Those patients who suffer from rare
conditions, who do not have the resources to reach the legisla-
ture, or who fail to gain media access will not benefit from legis-
lative intervention. Also, legislative debates are lengthy, and
patients with end stage diseases cannot wait for their outcomes.
Third, state mandates may be of no help to patients covered by
self-funded employee benefit plans because the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA) exempts self-funded
after her insurer denied coverage for a bone marrow transplant. After Rogers filed
suit, the insurer agreed to pay for her treatment, reaching its decision on the last day
she could qualify for the therapy without having to delay it and undergo further
chemotherapy. [d. at 290.
B See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123985 (West 1995); CAL. WELF. & lNST.
CoDE § 14133.8 (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4236 (West 1996); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 304.17-3165 (Michie 1996); MASS. ANN. LAWSch. 32A, § 17D (Law.
Co-op. 1996); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47R (Law. Co-op. 1996); MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 176G, § 4F (Law. Co-op 1996); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 176A, § 80 (Law.
Co-op. 1996); MAss. ANN. LAWSch. 176B, § 40 (Law. Co-op. 1996); MINN. STAT.
§ 62A.309 (1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-A:13 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. 17:48-
6f (West 1995).
9 See GA. CODE ANN. § 33.29-3.3 (1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-30-4.4 (1996); Mo.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.1200 (West Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6k (West
1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2504 (Supp. 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3418.1:1
(Michie 1999).
10See Jody C. Collins, Comment, Experimental Medical Treatments: Who Should
Decide Coverage?, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 451,481-82 (1997).
11 See David C. Hsia, Benefits Determination under Health Care Reform: Who
Should Decide Coverage Policy?, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 533, 552 (1994).
12 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6fnote (West 1996) (Assembly Insurance Commit-
tee Statement), which refers to the bill as the "Tishua Rollo Bill" and acknowledges
that the law was passed in response to the Tishna Rollo case, discussed above.
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plans from state laws that regulate insurance." Finally, em-
ployer-provided health insurance plans that cover particular
treatments pursuant to a state statute but deny coverage in simi-
lar circumstances not covered by the statute may be found to vio-
late the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)14 despite the
existence of relevant state legislation. The ADA prohibits em-
ployers from discriminating against employees with respect to all
"terms, conditions, and privileges of employment,'?" including
health insurance benefits."
In light of the deficiencies inherent in both the judicial and
state legislative approaches, federal legislation addressing the is-
sue of insurance coverage for experimental and investigational
treatment should be implemented. This Article proposes federal
legislation that draws from the solutions offered by two state stat-
utes, specifically those of Rhode Island!" and California.!" These
statutes feature a relatively comprehensive treatment of the
problem of insurance coverage for innovative or last-chance
therapies.
The Rhode Island statute mandates that health insurance orga-
nizations cover investigational cancer therapies if they are pro-
vided in the context of a Phase III or IV clinical trial'? that has
been approved by one of the organizations named in the statute
as long as no clearly superior nonexperimental alternative exists
for the patient.?" The law further requires that the patient meet
all protocol requirements and that the procedure be performed
in appropriate facilities with qualified personnel." The Califor-
nia statute requires that health benefits plans provide an in-
dependent, expert review of any decision to deny coverage for
experimental or investigational treatments for patients with ter-
minal conditions that are likely to cause death within two years
and for which there is no effective therapy.P
This Article proposes federal legislation that would supple-
13 FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990).
1442 U.S.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
1542 U.S.c. § 12112(a) (1994).
1629 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (1998).
17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27·18-36.2 (1998).
18 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.4 (West 1995).
19Until December 31, 1999 treatment in Phase II Clinical trials was covered as
well. R.I GEN. LAWS § 27-18·36.2.
20 Id.
21Id.
22 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.4.
ment existing state law. It would address all experimental treat-
ments for terminally ill patients and not focus solely upon those
suffering from cancer or upon procedures that receive extensive
attention from advocates and lobbyists, such as bone marrow
transplants. The federal statute would compel health insurance
plans to pay for investigational or experimental treatments pro-
vided in Phase III clinical trials for patients with any terminal
illness that is likely to cause death within two years so long as
particular criteria are met. These criteria would include require-
ments that the patient meet protocol requirements, that the indi-
vidual undergo the treatment at a qualified facility with qualified
personnel, and that no clearly superior non-experimental treat-
ment be available. In addition, the law would compel insurers to
pay for off-label use of drugs if the particular use is recognized in
a standard reference compendia or in a national, peer-reviewed
professional journal. The proposed legislation would further
mandate that the health benefits carrier provide an external, in-
dependent review of any decision to deny a terminally ill patient
coverage for off-label drug use or experimental and investiga-
tional treatments administered in a Phase III clinical trial. 23 Such
review will eliminate much litigation and avoid emotionally
draining and costly delays for patients desperately waiting for de-
cisions regarding potentially life-saving therapy.
Part I of this Article discusses coverage exclusions for experi-
mental and investigational treatments as they appear in a variety
of insurance policies. This section features a discussion of treat-
ments that have been excluded from coverage including high
dose chemotherapy with bone marrow transplants and off-label
drug use. Part II examines the manner in which courts have ap-
proached cases involving coverage denials for last-chance treat-
ments sought by terminally ill patients. Part III sets forth and
analyzes state statutes and their varied, but limited, solutions for
experimental treatment coverage denials and also analyzes the
more far-reaching solutions offered by the Rhode Island and Cal-
ifornia statutes. Part III also discusses the weaknesses of state
legislation as a solution to the problem in general, and in particu-
lar, the limitations of the statutes in light of ERISA and the
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. 23Health insurance providers could deny coverage for treatment only if they be-
lieved that one or more of the criteria specified in the federal statute had not been
fulfilled, e.g. there was a superior noninvestigational alternative or the individual
had not met protocol requirements.
...
, • _. "., " ' ,,- _ _-",., -.> "'." ..... , _ ...,,0=:0 •
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ADA. Part IV provides an overview of the evolution of federal
legislation in the area of health insurance policy and advocates
the implementation of additional federal regulation in this area.
Finally, Part V formulates a proposal for federal legislation ad-
dressing the issue of health insurance coverage for experimental
and investigational treatments and provides model statutory
language.
OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78, 1999]
I
PROVISIONS EXCLUDING COVERAGE FOR EXPERIMENTAL OR
INVESTIGATIONAL TREATMENT
Insurance plans define "experimental" or "investigational"
treatment in a variety of ways. Some policies provide that the
determination as to the status of the proposed therapy is to be
made solely by the plan administrator." Other health insurers
define experimental treatments as those under "clinical investiga-
tion," those "not generally recognized by the medical profession
as tested and accepted medical practice," or those still requiring
future "approval by the Federal Drug Administration or other
governmental agency.v" Some insurance companies establish
24 See Thomas v, Gulf Health Plan, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 590, 592-93 (S.D. Ala. 1988).
25 Boland v, King County Med. Blue Shield, 798 F. Supp. 638, 641 (W.D. Wash.
1992); see also Harris v, Mutual of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706 (7th en, 1993). The
exclusionary provision of the plan at issue stated:
A drug, device or medical treatment or procedure is experimental or
investigational:
(2) if Reliable Evidence shows that the drug, device or medical treatment
or procedure is the subject of on-going phase I, II, or III clinical trials or
under study to determine its maximum tolerated dose, its toxicity, its
safety, its efficacy, or its efficacy as compared with the standard means of
treatment or diagnosis; or
(3) if Reliable Evidence shows that the consensus of opinion among ex-
perts regarding the drug, device or medical treatment or procedure is that
further studies or clinical trials are necessary to determine its maximum
tolerated dose, its toxicity, its safety, its efficacy or its efficacy as compared
with the standard means of treatment or diagnosis.
rd. at 708. The plan defines the term "reliable evidence" as follows:
Reliable evidence shall mean only published reports and articles in the au-
thoritative medical and scientific literature; the written protocol or proto-
cols used by the treating facility or the protocol(s) of another facility
studying substantially the same drug, device or medical treatment or proce-
dure; or tbe written informed consent used by the lreating facility or by
another facility studying substantially the same drug, device or medical
treatment or procedure.
Ed. (emphasis omitted).
If an orthopedic surgeon either decided to conduct a time
study of how quickly she could apply casts to the broken
bones of her patients or decided to publish results of how
quickly the plaster hardened on those casts, [the insurance
company] could invoke the 'in connection with medical re-
search' clause to deny coverage for the common treatment of
applying a cast to a broken arm?9
Exclusionary provisions that allow administrators great lati-
tude in making coverage decisions have been condemned for cre-
ating conflicts of interest." The plan administrator owes both a
duty to the policy's beneficiaries and allegiance to the insurer."
The administrator, who is employed by the insurance provider,
realizes that he or she can enhance the insurer's profits by declin-
ing to pay the claims of policyholders and thus might be tempted
to construe coverage provisions very narrowly to deny claims as
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"corporate technology assessment committees" that determine
what therapies are covered under all of the policies issued by the
company." Still other plans exclude coverage of any treatment
"furnished in connection with medical or other research'?" or
that require patients to sign informed consent forms for
research."
Both courts and academic commentators have severely criti-
cized the terms of various exclusionary provisions relating to ex-
perimental or investigative treatments. With respect to a
provision that excluded coverage for any treatment furnished in
conjunction with medical research, an Illinois court commented
as follows:
26 E.g., Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D.N.I. 1989).
Blue Cross and Blue Shield utilizes a technology assessment program. Mary Ader,
Investigational Treatments: Coverage! Controversy, and Consensus, 5 ANNALS
HEAU'H L. 45, 52 (1996).
27 Farley v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 653, 659 (8th Cir. 1992).
28 Harris v, Mutual of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 1993); Dahl-Eimers
v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 812 F. Supp. 1193, 1196 (N.D. Fla. 1992), vacated
and remanded, 986 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1993). The contents of the informed consent
document is governed by the Code of Federal Regulations. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116-
.117 (1998) (Department of Health and Human Services regulations); 21. C.F.R.
§§ 50.20, 50.27 (1999) (Food and Drug Administration regulations).
29 Fuja v. Beuefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 809 F. Supp. 1333, 1341 (N.D. III. 1992),
rev'd, 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994).
30 See Denise S. Wolf, Comment, Who Should Pay for "Experimental" Treat-
ments? Breast Cancer Patients v. Their Insurers, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2029, 2074
(1995).
31 Id. at 2075.
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often as possible." The concern over economic self interest is
particularly compelling in cases where self-insured employers
make their own determinations regarding coverage exclusions
and thus stand to enjoy direct financial benefits from denial of
claims.P
This conflict of interest is likely to create at least the appear-
ance if not the reality of impropriety. One scholar has accused
insurance companies of being "motivated to refuse payment for
any and all expensive treatments on whatever grounds they can
find "34 and alleges that insurers "try to refuse coverage even
when affidavits attesting to the acceptance of the therapy are
submitted by recognized experts in the field in question.'?"
Other commentators, however, focus on the economic utility
of exclusionary clauses. In the words of one district court judge,
"subscriber premiums should not have to pay for procedures
which are purely experimental or investigative or subsidize every
scientist stirring a magic potion in some laboratory at the top of a
mountain with lightning flashing about."36 Some commentators
defend insurers and assert that "plan administrators are not
heartless beasts trying to deprive desperately ill persons of
needed medical care. They are responsible for administering a
plan as written, using limited funds available to them to provide
for the medical needs of all members of the plan."?"
It is thus arguable that the exclusion of coverage for experi-
mental or investigational treatment is necessary for purposes of
cost containment." Such exclusions insure that the provider's re-
sources will be used to pay only for treatments that are proved to
32 [d.
33See Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson, Symposium: The Law and Policy of
Health Care Rationing: Models and Accountability, Health Insurers' Assessment of
Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1637,1669 (1992); Dayna Bowen Matthew,
Controlling the Reverse Agency Costs of Employment-Based Health Insurance: of
Markets, Courts, and a Regulatory Quagmire, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1037
(1996).
34 Angela R. Holder, Symposium on the Legal and Ethical Implications of Innova-
tive Medical Technology, Funding Innovative Medical Treatment, 57 ALB, L. REV.
795,796 (1994).
35 [d. at 796-97.
36Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, No. CIV.A.90-597, 1990 WL 312647, at *1, *7
(D.N.]. Mar. 22, 1990).
37 Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise, A Trial Judge's View of Tort Reform, 25
SETON HALL L. REV. 853, 858 (1994).
38 Collins, supra note 10, at 474,
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be safe and effective." Moreover, it is claimed that exclusionary
clauses are essential in enabling insurance companies to set pre-
mium rates by enhancing the actuarial predictability of tbe costs
to be incurred by insurers."? Presumably, if insurance companies
could not predict which investigational and experimental treat-
ments would be developed by research facilities and which would
be demanded by members of its coverage group, tbe actuarial
basis for their premium rates could be invalidated.f! Clear cov-
erage guidelines, delineated in federal legislation, would thus not
only benefit patients, but would also be beneficial for insurance
companies, because they would enhance cost and expense
predictability.
A. Treatments that Have Been Excluded from Coverage
Insurance companies have denied coverage for a large variety
of treatments that they have designated as experimental or inves-
tigational:' One of the most frequently disputed therapies in re-
cent years is High Dose Chemotherapy with Autologous Bone
Marrow Transplant (HDC-ABMT). HDC-ABMT is a contro-
versial treatment, in part because, according to experts, between
five percent and twenty percent of patients die from tbe proce-
dure rather than from the underlying disease." The following
describes the process of HDC-ABMT in detail:
HDC-ABMT is a procedure by which stem cells are har-
vested from the bone marrow of the patient's body and puri-
fied of cancer cells. The patient is placed under general
anesthesia while the bone marrow is extracted by needle. The
bone marrow is then frozen and stored while the patient re-
ceives high, and potentially toxic, doses of chemotherapy. In
some cases, the chemotherapy is administered in doses which
exceed one thousand times the standard dosage for conven-
tional chemotherapy treatment. This high dose chemotherapy
kills not only the cancer, but also the patient's remaining bone
marrow which produces white blood cells to protect the body
from infection. The bone marrow, which is the most sensitive
of all the body tissue, is also the most damaged by chemother-
39Id. at 474-75.
40 u.
<t«. at 475 (quoting Zuckerberg v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 108 A.2d 56, 62
(1985».
42 See John A. Bourdeau, Propriety of Denial of Medical or Hospital Benefitsfor
Investigative, Educational, or Experimental Medical Procedures Pursuant to Exclu-
sian Contained in ERISA-Governed Healrh Plan, 12 A.LR. FED. 1 (1994).
43 Hardester, supra note 7, at 294.
,:J"" " ",~",.R _,~1'iI ~." \ ;:"'.,,~,, " . " .•• , ..... ' , - •....,."p"r __ .~" .. _'. ,.~_, __ ._;:-;;;. ••• ~ .. _~_ ~ •
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apy. After the chemotherapy is completed, the patient's
stored bone marrow is reinfused intravenously so that it may
re-engraft. The bone marrow then multiplies rapidly to re-
place the marrow destroyed during. the high~dos~chem~ther-
apy. Given that the bone marrow IS the patient s own tissue,
there is little danger of rejection. There are, however, signifi-
cant dangers associated with administering high-dose chemo-
therapy without some additional treatment to regenerate the
bone marrow. Because the toll on a patient's white blood cells
is significant, the secondary treatment is essential to the pa-
tient's chances for survivaL Thus, the bone marrow must be
quickly reintroduced after high-dose chemotherapy treatment
to "rescue" the patient from otherwise almost certain death.
"There is a narrow 'window of time during which the treat-
ment [can] be rendered.'''
... When undergoing HDC-ABMT, a patient is hospitalized,
requiring usually one to two weeks of constant care in an in-
tensive care ward. The entire procedure may cost as much as
$200,00044
The treatment has become even more controversial recently.
The American Society of Clinical Oncology released five clinical
study abstracts in advance of its annual meeting in May of 1999,
showing that in four out of five clinical trials conducted in the
United States and Europe and involving over 2000 women, inves-
tigators found "no significant difference in survival between pa-
tients receiving [HDC-ABMT] and those receiving lower-dose
chemotherapy without transplant support.v'" Only one study,
conducted in South Africa, showed that the experimental treat-
ment had a favorable result." The denial of insurance benefits
for HDC-ABMT for breast cancer patients has generated sub-
stantial publicity."? In the case of Fox v. Health Net, Inc., the jury
awarded eighty-nine million dollars to the estate of a breast can-
cer patient whose California-based health maintenance organiza-
tion had initially denied coverage for HDC-ABMT, although it
44 Janice M. Maggio, Determination of HDC-ABMT as Accepted Medical Practice
for the Treatment of Breast Cancer, 22 RUTGERS COMPlITER & TECH. LJ. 551, 556-
57 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
45 Stephanie Stapleton, Early Results Question Benefit of High-dose Chemother-
apy, AM_ MED. NEWS, May 10,1999, at 29; see also Joan Stephenson, Bone Marrow/
Stem Cells: No Edge in Breast Cancer, 281 lAMA 1576, 1576·78 (1999); Joan Ste-
phenson, Opinions Divided on High-Dose Chemotherapy for Breast Cancer, 282
lAMA 119 (1999) [hereinafter High-Dose Chemorherapy].
46See sources cited supra note 45.
47See Peter J. Thill, Insurers' and Courts' Response to High Dose Chemotherapy
with Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant in the Treatment of Breast Cancer:A Trag-
edy or Necessity?, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 863 (1995).
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later agreed to provide reimbursement for the treatment." The
lawsuit alleged that the delay cost the patient her life."? Insur-
ance providers, however, have also denied coverage for HDC-
ABMT for patients suffering frorn'" multiple myeloma," Wilms
tumor.P mediastinal germ cell carcinoma.>' chronic myeloid leu-
kemia," glioblastoma multiforme," and malignant melanoma. 56
In addition, health insurance coverage has been denied for the
following treatments based on the "experimental" status of the
procedure: liver transplants for a variety of diseases.F lung
transplant for the treatment of emphysema." an artificial heart
transplant" and in vitro fertilization for infertility.r"
B. Off-label Use of Drugs
Off-label drug use is the medical practice of prescribing a drug
for a use other than the one indicated on its FDA-approved label
or in a manner not indicated on the label.61 The FDA approves
new drugs after determining, through clinical studies, that they
are safe and effective for a specific clinical population/" Once a
drug is approved, a physician need not seek any governmental
approval if he or she wishes to use it in combination with another
48Norman Daniels & James E. Sabin, Last Chance Therapies and Managed Care:
Pluralism, Fair Procedures, and Legitimacy, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Mar.-Apr.
1998, at 27, 29.
49Id.
50See Bourdeau, supra note 42, for a detailed discussion of the cases listed below.
51 Schnitker v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 787 F. Supp. 903 (D.C. Neb. 1991); Dozsa
v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp, 131 (D.C.N.J. 1989). Multiple myeloma is a
cancer of the bone marrow.
5ZRollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, No. CIV.A. 90-597, 1990 WL 312647, at *1
(D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990). Wilms tumor is a disease of the kidney.
53 Bernards v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 987 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1993).
54 Burdette v. Mees, Nos. 90-3108, 90-3118, 1991U.S. App. LEXIS 10403 (4th Cir.
May 23, 1991). Chronic myeloid leukemia is a fatal disease of the blood and blood
producing tissues.
55McLeroy v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 1064 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
Glioblastoma multiforme is a cancerous tumor.
56Farley v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1992). Malignant
melanoma is skin cancer.
57 Holder, supra, note 34, at 798. Ms. Holder asserts that liver transplants "were
the first therapies to be refused coverage," Id.
58 Groft v. Health Care Corp., 792 F. Supp. 441 (D.C. Md. 1992).
59 Loyola Univ, v. Humana Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1993).
60 Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1988).
61 William L. Christopher, Off-Label Drug Prescription: Filling the Regulatory
Vacuum, 48 FOOD& DRUG LJ. 247,248 (1993).
6221 c.F.R. § 314.93(e)(2) (1999); 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (1999); Saver, supra note 2,
at 1110.
•
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drug or for a use that was not evaluated by the FDA63
Physicians may deviate from the use approved on drug labels
in several ways. Doctors may prescribe the medication to treat
conditions other than those for which it was initially intended.?"
Physicians may also prescribe the drug for patient populations
other than those for which it was originally approved, such as
children rather than adults." In addition, practitioners may alter
the dosage or method of administering the drug." Experts agree
that at least one-quarter of all prescriptions in the United States
are for off-label drug uses, and some estimate the figure to be
between forty percent and sixty percent.?" A 1991 study by the
United States General Accounting Office (GAO) found that
one-third of all prescriptions for chemotherapy to treat cancer
were off-label and over fifty percent of the patients received at
least one off-label drug." Some insurers consider off-label drug
use to be experimental and consequently excluded from benefits
coverage." Approximately twenty-three percent of the oncolo-
gists surveyed by the GAO acknowledged that they did not util-
ize a treatment they preferred because of concerns about cost,
including expected or actual denials of insurance reimburse-
ment.?" Additionally, sixty-two percent of the surveyed oncolo-
gists stated that they hospitalize patients whom they could treat
on an outpatient basis in order to ensure reimbursement for drug
therapies that may be excluded from coverage if the patient were
not admitted." Under Medicare, doctors can prescribe off-label
drugs to hospitalized patients and avoid scrutiny by the insurer
because Medicare provides fixed reimbursement for many serv-
63See 37 Fed. Reg. 16503 (1972) ("[Tlhe physician may, as part of the practice of
medicine, lawfully prescribe a different dosage for his patient, or may otherwise vary
the condition of use from those approved in the package insert, without informing or
obtaining the approval of the Food and Drug Administration."); see also UNITED
STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE OFF-LABEL DRUGS: R.ErMBURSEMENT POLICIES
CONSTRAIN PHYSICIANS IN THEIR OiOICE OF CANCER THERAPIES GAO/PEMD-91-
14, at 10-11 (1991) [hereinafter GAO REpORT].
64Kaspar 1. Stoffelmayr, Products Liability and "Off-Label" Uses of Prescription
Drugs, 63 U. Qu. L. REv. 275, 277 (1996).
65Id.
66Id.
67 Id. at 278.
68 GAO REpORT, supra note 63, at 3.
69 Melody L. Harness, Note, What is "Experimental" Medical Treatment?: A Leg-
islative Definirion is Needed, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 67, 72 (1996); see also GAO
REPORT, supra note 63, at 28-34.
70 GAO REPORT, supra note 63, at 35.
71 Id. at 38.
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ices received by in-patients in a hospital."
The reluctance of insurers to cover off-label drug use could
have significant financial implications. One commentator notes
that ironically, if insurers were to insist on agency approval of all
uses and mixtures of drugs, health care costs would rise dramati-
cally because repeated, lengthy FDA testing would be required
each time a doctor wished to try a new drug "cocktail" for cancer
or HIV patients." It takes approximately twelve years for new
drugs to be developed and approved in accordance with govern-
ment regulations." The practice of hospitalizing individuals who
could be treated as outpatients further raises healthcare costs."
In addition, mandatory testing of all drug uses would likely cause
litigation to proliferate because treatment opportunities and, po-
tentially lives, would be lost."
The federal government has attempted to remedy the problem
for Medicaid and Medicare patients. The Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act of 1990 requires Medicaid agencies to reimburse
patients for the off-label use of drugs if the prescribed use is rec-
ognized in any of the standard reference compendia, such as the
United States Pharmacopeia Drug Information, the American
Medical Association Drug Evaluations, and the American Hospi-
tal Formulary Service Drug Information."? The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 requires that Medicare cover off-label
drug use under the same criteria?8
Several state legislatures have also addressed the problem of
insurance providers excluding coverage for off-label drug use."
Some states have mandated reimbursement for off-label drugs
72[d. at 37,
73 Saver, supra note 2, at 1110.
74 Veronica Henry, Problems with Pharmaceutical Regulation in the United States,
14 J. LEGALMED. 617, 623 (1993).
75 GAO REPORT,supra note 63, at 38.
76 Henry, supra note 74, at 622-23.
77 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub, L. 101-508, 104 Stat.
1388 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S,c.),
78 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub, L. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(codified in scattered sections of 7 U,S.c.),
79 See Christopher, supra note 61, at 257; Harness, supra, note 69, at 73. New
York, for example, prohibits insurers from excluding coverage of off-label drug use
of cancer therapies if: (1) prescription drugs are generally covered in the policy; (2)
the drug is FDA-approved for treatment of some form of cancer; and (3) the off-
label use at issue is recognized by one of three major drug compendia or recom-
mended in a review article or editorial comment in a major peer-reviewed journal.
Id ; see also N.Y. INS. LAw § 3216(h)(12) (McKinney 1985 & Supp, 1999).
...
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prescribed to treat potentially terminal illnesses such as cancer or
HIV /AIDS, 80 As discussed below, this Article recommends that
federal legislation require that all insurers cover off-label drug
use if the use is recognized in one of the standard reference com-
pendia or in a national, peer-reviewed professional journal, thus
universalizing and expanding the standard applicable to Medi-
caid and Medicare patients, Furthermore, the proposed legisla-
tion provides an appeal mechanism that enrollees may utilize if
they are denied coverage for off-label drug use in the treatment




Much has been written about the courts' efforts to grapple with
insurance provisions that exclude coverage for experimental or
investigational treatments." Here the issue is addressed only
briefly for background purposes, For many years, the courts ap-
plied an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review to benefit
denials by health insurance plans governed by ERISA,82 Under
the arbitrary and capricious standard, deference was given to the
decision of the plan administrator." In a 1989 ruling, Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Brucht" the Supreme Court changed the
standard and held that "a denial of benefits ... is to be reviewed
under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the ad-
80 ALA. CODE § 27-1-10.1 (1994); CAL. Hexi.rn & SAFETYCODE § 1367.21 (West
1990 & Supp. 1999); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.195 (west 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 38a-492b, 38a·518b (West 1992 & Supp. 1999); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-8-20-
7,27-8-20-9 (Michie 1994); MASS. ANN. LAWSch, 175, § 47K, ch. 175 § 47, ch. 176A,
§ 8N, eli. 176A, § 8Q, ch.176B, § 4N, ch.176B, § 4P, ch.176G, § 4E, ch.176G, § 4G
(Law. Co-op. 1996 & Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 15-804 (1997); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26:1A-36.9 (West 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.66 (Stipp. 1999);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. til. 63, §§ 1-2604, 1-2605 (West 1996); R.J. GEN. LAWS § 27-55-2
(1998).
81 See, e.g., Bourdeau, supra note 42; Collins, supra note 10; Hardester, supra
note 7; Lahr, supra note 5; Saver, supra note 2; Wolf, supra note 30.
82 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989). ERlSA gov-
erns benefit plans that are established and maintained by employers for their em-
ployees. It does not reach health insurance purchased by individuals themselves or
benefits provided by other sources such as workers' compensation. See Taggart
Corp. Y. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1980); 29 C.F.R.
§ 2510.3-1 U) (1998).
83Doe Y. Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 85 (4th Cir. 1993);
Pokratz v. Jones Dairy Farm, 771 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1985).
84 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
Insurance Coverage for Experimental and investigational Treatments 217
ministrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eli-
gibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan."s5 The
arbitrary and capricious standard is, therefore, only utilized in
cases where the plan explicitly grants the administrator discretion
to make benefits determinations and interpret the plan provi-
sions. If the court perceives that a conflict of interest exists, as in
cases where the fiduciary who issues the plan and pays for its
benefits also administers the policy and determines benefits eligi-
bility, the court will afford less deference to the administrator."
Under the de novo standard of review, the court must determine
the intent of the contracting parties."
In assessing denials of coverage for "experimental or investiga-
tional" treatment under the de novo standard, the courts turn to
traditional contract and insurance law principles/" One com-
mentator describes these principles as follows:
(1) since an insurance policy is a contract, the court must as-
certain the parties' intent as manifested in the language of the
contract; (2) the conditions and exceptions of an insurance
contract are to be construed strictly against the insurer and
liberally in favor of the insured-patient; (3) all ambiguities are
to be construed against the insurance company and in favor of
the insured-patient; (4) the burden is on the insurer to estab-
lish that the policy does not cover the asserted dispute; and (5)
where the policy's language is not ambiguous, the court may
not reinterpret the coverage.S9
Other commentators state that patients have been successful
in challenging insurers' coverage denials in the following
circumstances:
(1) [T]he insurer ignored the language of the insurance plan,
(2) the insurer's decision to deny benefits was uninformed or
unreasonable, (3) the treatment was not experimental, (4) the
plan modification on which the insurer based its denial of cov-
erage was ineffective, or (5) the exclusionary language on
85 Id. at 115.
86 See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115; Doe, 3 F.3d at 85.
8? Firestone, 489 U.S. at 113. The de novo standard mandates review of the fiduci-
ary's decision "by looking to the terms of the plan and other manifestations of the
parties' intent." Id.
88 BarbaraA. Fisfis,Who Should Rightfully Decide Whether A Medical Treatment
Necessarily Incurred Should Be Excluded from Coverage under a Health Insurance
Policy Provision Which Excludes from Coverage "Experimental'! Medical Treat-
ments?, 31 DUQ. L REV. 777,781 (1993).
89 Id. at 781-82.
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which the insurer relied was ambiguous.?"
There is little disagreement, however, about the fact that the
courts' decisions regarding exclusionary provisions in health ben-
efits plans have been unpredictable and inconsistent." For ex-
ample, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have ruled that HDC-
ABMT for breast cancer is experimental and need not be cov-
ered by the plans in question.F Conversely, the Eighth Circuit
found that HDC-ABMT was not an experimental therapy for
breast cancer and ordered the defendant to pay for the proce-
dure?' Likewise, while one court found that HDC-ABMT for
multiple myeloma constituted experimental treatment and was
justifiably excluded from coverage by the insurer;' several other
courts have found that the treatment was not experimental for
multiple myeloma, when considering exclusionary provisions
with similar language."
90 Catherine A. Voigt & Kevin J. Conlon, Insurance Coverage for Experimental
Treatment: New Hope for Patients, 83 ILL B,], 396, 398 (1995),
91 Jennifer Barber, Note, Experimental Treatment Exclusions from Medical lnsur-
ance Coverage: Who Should Decide?, I-SPG WIDENERL. SYMP.J. 389, 400, 406
(1996); Collins, supra note 10, at 455; Lahr, supra note 5; Saver, supra note 2.
92 See Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993) (for the lan-
guage of the exclusionary provision, see supra, note 25); Holder v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 951 F.2d 89, 90 n.3 (5th Cir. 1992) (the policy excluded coverage of therapies
that were not "commonly and customarily recognized throughout the doctor's pro-
fession as appropriate in the treatment of the diagnosed sickness or injury" or that
were "educational or experimental in nature").
93 Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 1995) (The
health insurance plan in question covered high dose chemotherapy (HDCf) only for
particular cancers, not including breast cancer, since it considered the treatment ex-
perimental for all but the specified cancers. The Eighth Circuit reversed and re-
manded the lower court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction,
finding that she showed a likelihood of success on the merits in proving that HDCT
is an "accepted" therapy for breast cancer.); see also Adams v. Blue CrossfBlue
Shield, 757 F. Supp. 661, 672 (D. Md. 1991) (The plan excluded coverage for "any
treatment ... not generally acknowledged as accepted medical practice by the suita-
ble medical specialty practicing in Maryland, as decided by us, Utilizing a de novo
review standard, the court found that "HDCf ~ABMTwas generally acknowledged
as accepted medical practice by Maryland oncologists. ").
94 Schnitker v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 787 F. Supp. 903, 904 (D.C. Neb. 1991)
(plan excluded from coverage any treatment that had not received final approval
from the appropriate governmental entity or had been accepted by a consensus of
opinion based on scientific evidence).
95See Leonhardt v. Holden Bus. Forms Co., 828 F. Supp. 657, 663 (D. Minn. 1993)
(plan defined as "experimental" any treatment that is: (a) not proven in an objective
manner to have therapeutic value or benefit; (b) restricted to use at medical facilities
capable of carrying out scientific studies; or (c) of questionable medical effective-
ness); Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 134 (D.NJ. 1989) (plan
excluded coverage for treatments that were not "commonly and customarily recog-
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Careful consideration of the caselaw reveals that the courts are
an inappropriate forum for the resolution of controversies relat-
ing to coverage exclusions for experimental treatment. First, one
must consider the needs and circumstances of the patients who
are denied reimbursement for last-chance treatments. As Repre-
sentative Dennis Hastert stated while discussing a GOP bill in-
tended to strengthen patient rights, "patients should get their
treatment in hospital rooms, not courtrooms.T" Critically ill pa-
tients who are in desperate need of life-saving therapy may not
have the energy, resources or time for court battles. Even with
adequate insurance coverage, serious illnesses can be extraordi-
narily expensive because of deductibles, copayments, and deter-
minations that certain charges exceed the "reasonable and
customary" cost of such treatment. The cost of care can sky-
rocket if the patient and family choose to tum to a distant facility
with special expertise, such as a national cancer center, and must
pay for travel and lodging expenses. Consequently, patients may
not have financial resources to divert to lawyers and litigation.
In addition, litigation often consumes significant time, a luxury
which critically ill patients do not have. The treatment of HDC-
ABMT, for example, can be administered only during a short
"window" of time, when the patient is at a particular stage of the
disease, but not too ill to withstand the harsh treatment.l" If the
court fails to decide the case during this limited time, the patient
may lose the opportunity to benefit from the treatment or may
have to delay it for a significant period. Several plaintiffs have
died from their illnesses before the courts issued final judgments
in their cases.?"
Finally, many critically ill patients may not have the initiative
or the energy to pursue Ittigation." Patients may forego the
quest for treatment in order to avoid stressful and exhausting
court battles during what may well be their last months of life.
The judiciary is a poor forum for several more technical rea-
sons as well. Court decisions are based upon the specific lan-
nized throughout the doctor's profession as appropriate in the treatment of the sick-
ness or injury" or that were "educational" or "experimental in nature" or were
"provided primarily for research purposes").
96 Bennett Roth, House Republicans detail their limits on managed care, HOUSTON
CHRON., June 25, 1998, at 2A.
97 See Maggio, supra note 44, at 556-57.
98 Barber, supra note 91, at 408 n.112.
99 [d. at 408.
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guage of the contract at issue and a determination of the intent of
the parties.'?" Therefore, court rulings are of little precedential
value and provide very limited guidance for patients and insurers
attempting 10 determine the best course of action in their own
circumstances. The inconsistency among judicial decisions inter-
preting similar exclusionary provisions further hinders the ability
of parties to predict the outcomes of future controversies based
on a reading of past precedent.'?'
In addition, judges often lack the expertise necessary to make
determinations regarding which medical treatments are experi-
mental and which are not. As discussed above, many insurance
plans provide that in order to determine whether treatment is
"experimental," the administrator must assess "reliable evi-
dence" concerning the consensus of opinion regarding the medi-
cal procedure'?" or determine whether the therapy is "generally
recognized by the medical profession as tested and accepted
medical practice.t'?" In order to decide responsibly whether a
particular treatment meets the definition of "experimental"
under such plans, courts must essentially conduct an independent
study of the medical literature and an evaluation of expert testi-
mony."'" Judges, burdened with over-crowded dockets, may not
have sufficient time to invest in a thorough study of medical data
and are likely to lack the scientific proficiency to fully understand
contemporary research.'?" These limitations may explain some
of the inconsistencies and discrepancies among court decisions
involving similar facts and benefit plan provisions.
Finally, the intensely emotional nature of life and death deci-
sions regarding last chance treatments may often obfuscate the
issues for the judge and hinder the court's ability to make neutral
decisions.l'" Surely, judges recognize that by affirming an in-
surer's denial of coverage for a particular treatment, they may
expedite the death of the patient who has turned to the court as a
last resort.l'" In one case involving a claimant seeking coverage
100 Fisfis, supra note 88, at 781-82.
101Barber, supra note 91, at 407.
102Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 992 F.ld 706, 708 (7th Cir. 1993).
103 Boland v, King County Med. Blue Shield, 798 F. Supp. 638, 641 (W.D. Wash.
1992).
104 See Barber, supra note 91, at 407.
1051d.
106 Id.
107 Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, No. C1Y.A.90-597, 1990WL 312647, at '1-2
(D.NJ. Mar. 22, 1990).
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for HDC-ABMT, a U.S. district judge described the difficulties
faced by the judiciary in such cases:
Despite rumors to the contrary, those who wear judicial robes
are human beings, and as persons, are inspired and motivated
by compassion as anyone would be. Consequently, we often
must remind ourselves that in our official capacities, we have
authority only to issue rulings within the narrow parameters of
the law and the facts before us. The temptation to go about,
doing good where we see fit, and to make things less difficult
for those who come before us, regardless of the law, is strong.
But the law, without which judges are nothing, abjures such
unlicensed formulation of unauthorized social policy by the
judiciary.'?"
Judges, faced with these cases, may well opt to rule that a
deep-pocket insurer must expend additional dollars to cover a
potentially life-saving treatment rather than affirm a coverage
denial and issue a potential death sentence to a patient. Clear
federal legislation could significantly reduce the number of cases
that come before the courts and thus relieve judges of the need
to resolve this dilemma in each individual case.
III
STATE STATUTES REGULATING COVERAGE FOR
"EXPERIMENTAL" TREATMENTS
Several state legislatures have responded to the problem of
coverage exclusions for experimental or investigational treat-
ment by mandating that insurance providers either reimburse pa-
tients for the cost of certain treatments under particular
circumstances or at least offer enrollees coverage options for spe-
cific therapies. The majority of these statutes address only cover-
age for HDC-ABMT, the most well publicized and controversial
of the treatments that have been deemed experimental by insur-
ance providers.
A. Statutes Requiring the Option of Coverage for Bone
Marrow Treatments
Five states, including Missouri,'o9 New Jersey,nO Virginia,"l
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Georgia.P? and Tennessee.F' have enacted statutes that require
insurers to offer coverage for HDC-ABMT. "Mandate to offer"
provisions allow subscribers to select whether they wish to be
covered for the expensive treatment. Those who opt for cover-
age pay higher premiums than those who do not, and thus the
cost of the treatment is not borne by the subscriber pool as a
whole.'!
The Missouri statute compels insurance providers to offer cov-
erage for the treatment of breast cancer by HDC-ABMT that is
performed pursuant to nationally accepted, peer-reviewed proto-
COIS.'15 The Missouri law forbids insurers to charge higher de-
ductibles or copayments than those charged for other covered
services but allows the imposition of a lifetime benefit maximum
for HDC-ABMT of not less than $100,000."6
The New Jersey statute applies only to providers that have re-
served the right to change premiums and requires them to offer
benefits for HDC-ABMT performed for any cancer patient by
institutions approved by the National Cancer Institute or pursu-
ant to protocols that follow the guidelines of the American Soci-
ety of Clinical Oncologists.1l7 Insurers are not prohibited from
112GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 33-29-3.3, 33-30-4.4 (1996).
113TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2504 (Supp. 1998).
114 Collins, supra note 10, at 473.
115Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.1200 (West Supp. 1999) provides in relevant part:
1. Each entity offering individual and group health insurance policies pro-
viding coverage on an expense-incurred basis, individual and group service
or indemnity type contracts issued by a health services corporation, individ-
ual and group service contracts issued by a health maintenance organiza-
tion, all self-insured group arrangements to the extent not preempted by
federal law and all managed health care delivery entities of any type or
description, that are delivered. issued for delivery, continued or renewed in
this state on or after January 1, 1996, shall offer coverage for the treatment
of breast cancer by dose-intensive chemotherapy/autologous bone marrow
transplants or stem cell transplants when performed pursuant to nationally
accepted peer review protocols utilized by breast cancer treatment centers
experienced in dose-intensive chemotherapy/autologous bone marrow
transplants or stem cell transplants. The offer of benefits under this section
shall be in writing and must be accepted in writing by the individual or
group policyholder or contract holder.
2. Such health care service shall not be subject to any greater deductible or
copayment than any other health care service provided by the policy, con.
tract or plan, except that the policy, contract or plan may contain a provi-
sion imposing a lifetime benefit maximum of not less than one hundred
thousand dollars, for dose-intensive chemotherapy/autologous bone mar-
row transplants or stem cell transplants for breast cancer treatment.
116 [d.
117N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6k (West 1996) provides:
adjusting premiums or requiring reasonable deductibles or
copayments for HDC-ABMT."8
Under the Virginia statute, insurers are required to offer cov-
erage for the treatment of breast cancer by HDC-ABMT that is
performed pursuant to protocols approved by any United States
medical teaching college and that have been used by physicians
experienced with the procedure."9 The Virginia law prohibits in-
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In addition to benefits provided under regulations adopted pursuant to
P.L.1992, c. 161 (C. 17B:27 A-2 et seq.) and P.L.1992, c. 162 (C. 17B:27A-17
et seq.), a hospital service corporation shall offer under every group or in-
dividual hospital service corporation contract providing hospital or medical
expense benefits delivered, issued, executed or renewed in this State, or
approved for issuance or renewal in this State by the Commissioner of In-
surance, on or after the effective date of this act to provide benefits for the
treatment of cancer by dose-intensive chemotherapy/autologous bone mar-
row transplants and peripheral blood stem cell transplants when performed
by institutions approved by the National Cancer Institute or pursuant to
protocols consistent with the guidelines of the American Society of Clinical
Oncologists. Benefits for such treatment shall be provided to the same ex-
tent as for any other illness under the contract.
The offer required pursuant to this section shall apply to all hospital ser-
vice corporation contracts in which the hospital service corporation has re-
served the right to change the premium. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to limit a hospital service corporation in adjusting premium
amounts, or providing for reasonable deductibles or copayments, with re-
spect to benefits provided pursuant to this section.
See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:48A-7j, 17:48E-35.8, 17B:26-2.1j, 17B:27-46.1j, and
26:2j.4:8 (applying the above-described mandate to offer to medical service corpora-
tions, health service corporations, insurers providing health insurance that is not
group or blanket insurance, insurers providing group policies, and health mainte-
nance organizations, respectively).
118Id,
119VA, CODE ANN. § 38.2-3418.1:1 (Michie 1999) reads in part as follows:
A. Each insurer proposing to issue individual or group accident and sick-
ness insurance policies providing hospital, medical and surgical, or major
medical coverage on an expense-incurred basis, each corporation providing
individual or group accident and sickness subscription contracts, and each
health maintenance organization providing a health care plan for health
care services shall offer and make available coverage under such policy,
contract or plan delivered, issued for delivery or renewed in this Common-
wealth on and after January 1, 1995, for the treatment of breast cancer by
dose-intensive chemotherapy/autologous bone marrow transplants or stem
cell transplants when performed pursuant to protocols approved by the in-
stitutional review board of any United States medical teaching college in-
cluding, but not limited to, National Cancer Institute protocols that have
been favorably reviewed and utilized by hematologists or oncologists ex-
perienced in dose-intensive chemotherapy/autologous bone marrow trans-
plants or stem cell transplants.
B, Such coverage shall not be subject to any greater copayment than that
applicable to any other coverage provided by such policies, contracts or
plans, and such coverage shall be subject to the same deductible as that
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surers from charging higher copayments than those imposed for
any other services, but permits the application of deductibles that
are different from those associated with other therapies.F"
The Georgia statute pertains to both breast cancer and Hodg-
kin's disease patients.'?' It instructs insurers to make available
applicable to any other coverage; however, a deductible for such coverage
in an amount different than that applicable to any other coverage may also
be offered and made available.
120 ld.
121 GA. CODE ANN. § 33-29-3.3 (1996) provides:
a) Every insurer authorized to issue individual accident and sickness insur-
ance plans, policies, or contracts shall be required to make available, either
as a part of or as an optional endorsement to all such policies providing
major medical insurance coverage which are issued, delivered, issued for
delivery, or renewed on or after July 1, 1995, coverage for bone marrow
transplants for the treatment of breast cancer and Hodgkin's disease. Such
coverage shall be at least as extensive and provide at least the same degree
of coverage as that provided by the respective plan, policy, or contract for
the treatment of other types of physical illnesses. Such an optional en-
dorsement shall also provide that the coverage required to be made avail-
able pursuant to this Code section shall also cover the spouse and the
dependents of the insured if the insured's spouse and dependents are cov-
ered under such benefit plan, policy, or contract.
(b) The optional endorsement required to be made available under subsec-
tion (a) of this Code section shall not contain any exclusions, reductions, or
other limitations as to coverages, deductibles or coinsurance provisions
which apply to bone marrow transplants for the treatment of breast cancer
and Hodgkin's disease unless such provisions apply generally to other simi-
lar benefits provided or paid for under the accident and sickness insurance
benefit plan, policy, or contract.
(c) Nothing in this Code section shall be construed to prohibit an insurer,
nonprofit corporation, health care plan, health maintenance organization,
or other person issuing any similar individual accident and sickness insur-
ance benefit plan, policy, or contract from issuing or continuing to issue an
individual accident and sickness insurance benefit plan, policy, or contract
which provides benefits greater than the minimum benefits required to be
made available under this Code section or from issuing any such plans,
policies, or contracts which provide benefits which are generally more
favorable to the insured than those required to be made available under
this Code section.
(d) Nothing in this Code section shall be construed to prohibit the inclusion
of coverage for bone marrow transplants for the treatment of breast cancer
and Hodgkin's disease that differs from the coverage provided in the same
insurance plan, policy, or contract for physical illnesses if the policyholder
does not purchase the optional coverage made available pursuant to this
Code section.
(e) The provisions of this Code section shall apply to individual accident
and sickness insurance policies issued by a fraternal benefit society, a non-
profit hospital service corporation, a nonprofit medical service corporation,
a health care plan, a health maintenance organization, or any similar entity.
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coverage for bone marrow transplants for these illnesscs.F? The
offer of coverage may not contain any exclusion, reduction, or
other limitations as to coverages, deductibles, or coinsurance
provisions unless these limitations apply generally to similar cov-
ered benefits.F'
The Tennessee statute applies to HDC-ABMT for any cancer
and allows insurers to offer coverage for the procedure at an ad-
ditional COSt.124 Insurance providers, however, are not permitted
to charge greater deductibles or copayments for HDC-ABMT
than those associated with any other service under the plan.':"
Although "mandates to offer" may provide enhanced choice to
the consumer, such provisions may not significantly benefit many
patients. Given a choice, healthy insurance purchasers are un-
likely to elect to pay a higher cost for potential coverage of "a
treatment that they probably have never heard of for a disease
they think they will not get."!"
B. Statutes Requiring the Provision of Coverage for Bone
Marrow Treatments
States have been more forceful in other instances and have
passed legislation mandating coverage for HDCABMT. These
See also GA. CODE ANN. * 33-30-4.4 (1996) (applying similar requirements to group
or blanket accident and sickness insurance).
122 See statutes cited supra note 121.
123See statutes cited supra note 12l.
124TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2504 (Supp. 1998) reads in part as follows:
(a) In the event that coverage for the treatment of cancer by dose-intensive
chemotherapy/autologous bone marrow transplants or stem cell transplants
is provided for patients or enrollees included in the TennCare program,
then each insurer proposing to issue individual or group accident and sick-
ness insurance policies providing hospital, medical and surgical, or major
medical coverage on an expense-incurred basis, each corporation providing
individual or group accident and sickness subscription contracts, and each
health maintenance organization providing a health care plan for health
care services shall offer and make available such coverage, in the manner
provided in subsection (b), under such policy, contract or plan delivered,
issued for delivery or renewed in this state on and after January 1, 1996.
(b) Such coverage may be offered at an additional cost but such health care
service shall not be subject to any greater deductible than any other health
care service under such policy, contract or plan. Any required copayment
shall not exceed the standard copayment required by the insured's policy,
contract or plan for health care service.
I2SId.
126 Collins, supra note 10, at 473.
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states are California,'?" Minnesota.F" New Hampshire.P? Ken-
tucky.P" Massachusetts,'?' New Jersey,':" and Florida.'33 Their
respective statutes, however, vary significantly.
California requires reimbursement for both donor and recipi-
ent surgery involved in bone marrow transplants for any cancer if
certain conditions are met.P" These conditions include recom-
mendation of the treatment by the patient's physician, perform-
ance of the procedure in a hospital that is a participant in the
Medi-Cal program, and approval of the transplant by the hospi-
tal's medical policy committee and by the insurer's medical con-
sultant.':" Plan administrators are explicitly prohibited from
denying coverage based on a characterization of the bone mar-
127 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123985 (West 1996); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 14133.8 (West 1991).
128 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62A.309 (West 1996).
129 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 415:18-c, 420-A:13, 420-B:8-e (1998).
130Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.17-3165, 304.l7A-135, 304.18-0985, 304.32-1595,
and 304.38-1936 (Michie 1996).
131MASS. ANN. LAWSch. 175, § 47R (Law. Co-op. 1996); MASS. ANN. LAWSch.
176A, § 80 (Law. Co-op. 19%); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 176B, § 40 (Law. Co-op.
1996); MASS. ANN. LAws ch, 176G, § 4F (Law. Co-op. 1996); and MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 32A, § 170 (Law. Co-op. 19%).
132 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:48-6f, 17:48A-7e, 17:48E-35.3, 17B:26-2.ld, and 17B:27-
46.1e (West 1996).
133FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4236 (West 19%).
134CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14133.8 (West 1991) provides as follows:
(a) A bone marrow transplant for the treatment of cancer for beneficiaries,
sball be reimbursable under this cbapter, when all of the following condi-
tions are met:
(1) The bone marrow transplant is recommended by the recipient's
physician.
(2) The bone marrow transplant is performed in a hospital that is approved
for participation in the Medi-Cal program.
(3) The bone marrow transplant is a reasonable course of treatment and is
approved by the hospital medical policy committee when there is an ex-
isting committee or a committee can be established.
(4) The bone marrow transplant has been deemed appropriate for the re-
cipient by the program's medical consultant. The medical consultant shall
not disapprove the bone marrow transplant solely on the basis that it is
classified as experimental or investigational,
(5) Full federal financial participation is available for reimbursement for
the performance of the bone marrow transplant.
(b) The program shall provide reimbursement for both donor and recipient
surgery.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123985 (West J 9%), pertaining to child health,
eliminates subsection (5) and alters subsection (2) as follows: (2) "The bone marrow
transplant is performed in a hospital that is approved for participation in the Califor-
nia Children's Services program,"
135 See discussion supra note 134.
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row transplant as experimental or investigational.P"
Minnesota's statute applies to HDC-ABMT for breast cancer
alone, rather than for any cancer. The law mandates coverage of
the treatment for all residents of Minnesota and prohibits insur-
ance providers from charging greater coinsurance, copayments,
or deductibles for HDC-ABMT for breast cancer than those
charged for any other treatment covered by the plan.P? New
Hampshire also addresses only HDC-ABMT for breast cancer
patients and provides full coverage for residents of the state who
receive the treatment according to protocols approved by the Na-
tional Cancer Institute.':"
The Kentucky statute instructs that HDC-ABMT or high dose
chemotherapy with stem cell transplantation P? for breast cancer
may not be considered experimental or investigational and must
136 See discussion supra note 134.
137 MINN.STAT.ANN. §§ 62A.309 (1996) reads in part as follows:
Subd. 2. Required coverage. Every health plan ... must provide to each
covered person who is a resident of Minnesota coverage for the treatment
of breast cancer by high-dose chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow
transplantation and for expenses arising from the treatment.
Subd. 3. Greater coinsurance or copayment prohibited. Coverage under
this section shall not be subject to any greater coinsurance or copayment
than that applicable to any other coverage provided by the health plan.
Subd. 4. Greater deductible prohibited. Coverage under this section shall
not be subject to any greater deductible than that applicable to any other
coverage provided by the health plan.
138 N.H. REv. STAT.ANN. § 415:18-c (1998) provides:
Each insurer that issues or renews any policy of group or blanket accident
or health insurance providing benefits for medical or hospital expenses,
Shall provide to each group, or to the portion of each group comprised of
certificate holders of such insurance who are residents of this state and
whose principal place of employment is in this state, coverage for expenses
arising from the treatment of breast cancer by autologous bone marrow
transplants according to protocols reviewed and approved by the National
Cancer Institute.
The other provisions cited in supra note 129 apply the same requirements to non-
profit health service corporations and health maintenance organizations. .
139 For an explanation of the stem cell transplantation procedure, or peripheral
stem cell rescue (PSCR) as it is otherwise known, see Courts Continue to Struggle
with the Exclusion in Medical Plans for Experimental Procedures: A Review of the
Circuit Court Cases Concerning High Dose Chemotherapy as a Treatment for Cancer
in Connection with Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant or Peripheral St~m Cell
Rescue, 4 No.6 ERISA LITIG.REp. 6 (1996). PSCR is a newer, less invasive, and
less costly procedure than ABMT. The patient receives dosages of chemotherapy
which are high enough to "mobilize" stem cells from the bone marrow into the
peripheral blood. The blood is removed from the body. centrifuged to separate tbe
stem cells, and then is returned to the body without the stem cells. The stem cells
are stored in a cold environment and are returned to the blood after HDC. Id, at 7.
...
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be covered by any plan tbat provides coverage for the treatment
of breast cancer by standard chemotherapy.'?" The tberapy must
be performed in an institution tbat complies witb the guidelines
of one of the organizations specified in the statute, and coverage
for transplantation may not be subject to greater coinsurance or
copayment than that applicable to any other treatment covered
by the plan.v"
The Massachusetts statute is more restrictive than most other
state statutes.':" It requires coverage only for bone marrow
140Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17-3165 (Michie 1996) provides:
(1) All insurers issuing individual health insurance policies in this Com-
monwealth which provide coverage for treatment of breast cancer by
chemotherapy on an expense-incurred basis shall also provide coverage for
treatment of breast cancer by high-dose chemotherapy with autologous
bone marrow transplantation or stem cell transplantation.
(2) The administration of high-dose chemotherapy with autologous bone
marrow transplantation or stem cell transplantation shall only be covered
when performed in institutions that comply with the guidelines of the
American Society for Blood and Marrow Transplantation or the Interna-
tional Society of Hematotherapy and Graft Engineering, whichever has the
higher standard.
(3) Treatment of breast cancer by high-dose chemotherapy with autologous
bone marrow transplantation or stern cell transplantation shall not be con-
sidered experimental or investigational. Coverage for transplantation
under this section shall not be subject to any greater coinsurance or copay-
ment than that applicable to any other coverage provided by the health
plan.
See also Ky. REV. STAT, ANN. §§ 304.17A-135, 304.18-0985, 304.32-1595, 304.38-
1936 (applying the statutory language to (1) health benefit plans; (2) insurers issuing
group or blanket health insurance policies; (3) nonprofit hospitals, medical-surgical,
dental, and health service corporations issuing benefits contracts; and (4) health
maintenance organizations issuing benefits contracts, respectively).
141 See statutes cited supra note 140.
142MAss. ANN. LAWSch. 175, § 47R (Law. Co-op 1996) provides as follows:
Any individual policy of accident and sickness insurance issued pursuant to
section one hundred and eight, and any group blanket policy of accident
and sickness insurance issued pursuant to section one hundred and ten,
shall provide coverage for a bone marrow transplant or transplants for per-
sons who have been diagnosed with breast cancer that has progressed to
metastatic disease; provided, however, that said person shall meet the critc-
ria established by the department of public health, The department of pub-
lic health shall promulgate rules and rjegulations establishing criteria for
eligibility] for coverage hereunder which shall be consistent with medical
research protocols reviewed and approved by the National Cancer
Institute.
See also MASS. ANN. LAWSch. 176A, § 80 (Law. Co-op. 1996) (providing similar
coverage for individuals covered under any contract between a subscriber and a cor-
poration under an individual or group hospital service plan); MAss. ANN. LAWSch.
176B, § 40 (Law. Co-op. 1996) (mandating similar coverage by individual or group
medical service agreements); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 176G, § 4F (Law. Co-op. 1996)
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transplants utilized to treat breast cancer that has progressed to
metastatic disease.':" The patient must meet criteria established
by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health that are con-
sistent with medical research protocols approved by the National
Cancer Institute.'?"
As discussed above, New Jersey enacted a statute that requires
insurers to offer coverage for the treatment of cancer by HDC-
ABMT in particular circumstances.!" With respect to one type
of cancer, however, New Jersey law mandates coverage."? The
statute requires that insurers provide medical expense benefits
for the treatment of Wilm's tumor':" by any means, including
HDC-ABMT, when standard chemotherapy has failed.l'"
Florida offers a more sophisticated approach. Its law man-
dates that insurers cannot deny coverage for bone marrow trans-
plants that are recommended by a treating physician if the
procedure is accepted within the relevant oncological specialty
and not experimental.l''? The determination of which bone mar-
(applying the same requirements to group health maintenance contracts); MASS.
ANN.LAWSch. 32A, § to (Law. Co-op. 1996) (providing the same coverage lor any
active or retired employee of the state who is insured under group insurance
coverage).
143Metastatic cancer is cancer that has spread beyond its site of origin. The
spread can occur through the bloodstream, through the lymphatic system, or across
body cavities. See TOBER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DrcnONARY 1118 (16th cd.
1989).
144 MASS.ANN. LAWSch. 175, § 47R (Law. Co-op. 1996).
145 N.J. STAT.ANN. § 17:48-6k (West 1996).
146 N.J. STAT.ANN. § 17B:27-46.1e (WesI1996) provides as follows:
Every group health insurance policy providing hospital or medical expense
benefits shall provide benefits to any named insured or other person cov-
ered thereunder for expenses incurred in the treatment of Wilm's tumor,
including autologous bone marrow transplants when standard chemother-
apy treatment is unsuccessful, notwithstanding that any such treatment
may be deemed experimental or investigational. These benefits shall be
provided to the same extent as for any other sickness under the policy.
See also N.J. STAT.ANN. §§ 17B:26-2.1d, 17:48-6f, 17:48A-7e, 17:48E-35.3, 26:2J-4.1
(West 1996) (applying the same terms to health insurance other than group and
blanket insurance, hospital service corporations, medical service corp~ratIons,
health service corporations, and health maintenance organizations, tespectJvely).
147Wilrn's tumor is a rare form of cancer which affects the kidneys before spread-
ing to other parts 01 the body. See N.J. STAT.ANN. § 17:48-61note (West 1996)
(Assembly Insurance Committee Statement).
148ld.
149 FLA. STAT.ANN. § 627.4236 (West 1996) reads, in relevanl pari, as follows:
(1) As used in this section, the term "bone marrow transplant" means
human blood precursor cells administered to a patient to restore nor~al
hematological and immunological functions following ablative therapy With
,;; " '. . ..,~._~M·..... . " ~ .' ." '_L __ .......- __ ;> __ .. _~ _ •• _~. .;"" .. ~ _ ~- •
230 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78, 1999]
curative intent. Human blood precursor cells may be obtained from the
patient in an autologous transplant or from a medically acceptable related
or unrelated donor, and may be derived from bone marrow, circulating
blood, or a combination of bone marrow and circulating blood. If chemo-
therapy is an integral part of the treatment involving bone marrow trans-
plantation, the term "bone marrow transplant" includes both the
transplantation and the chemotherapy.
(2) An insurer or a health maintenance organization may not exclude cov-
erage for bone marrow transplant procedures recommended by the refer-
ring physician and the treating physician under a policy exclusion for
experimental, clinical investigative, educational, or similar procedures con-
tained in any individual or group health insurance policy or health mainte-
nance organization contract issued, amended, delivered, or renewed in this
state that covers treatment for cancer, if the particular use of the bone
marrow transplant procedure is determined to be accepted within the ap-
propriate oncological specialty and not experimental pursuant to subsec-
tion (3).
(3)(a) The Secretary of Health and Rehahilitative Services must adopt
rules specifying the bone marrow transplant procedures that are accepted
within the appropriate oncological specialty and are not experimental for
purposes of this section. The rules must be based upon recommendations
of an advisory panel appointed by the Secretary, composed of:
1. One adult oncologist, selected from a list of three names recom-
mended by the Florida Medical Association;
2. One pediatric oncologist, selected from a list of three names recom-
mended by the Florida Pediatric Society;
3. One representative of the J. Hillis Miller Health Center at the Univer-
sity of Florida;
4. One representative of the H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Re-
search Institute, Inc.;
5. One consumer representative, selected from a list of three names rec-
ommended by the Insurance Commissioner;
6. One representative of the Health Insurance Association of America;
7. Two representatives of health insurers, one of whom represents the
insurer with the largest Florida health insurance premium volume and
one of whom represents the insurer with the second largest Florida
health insurance premium volume; and
8. One representative of the insurer with the largest Florida small group
health insurance premium volume.
(b) The Secretary must also appoint a member of the advisory panel to
serve as chairperson.
(c) [The Agency] must provide, within existing resources, staff support to
enable the panel to carry out its responsibilities under this section.
(d) In making recommendations and adopting rules under this section, the
advisory panel and the Secretary shall:
1. Take into account findings, studies, or research of the federal Agency
for Health Care Policy, National Cancer Institute, National Academy of
Sciences, Health Care Financing Administration, and Congressional Of-
fice of Technology Assessment, and any other relevant information.
2. Consider whether the federal Food and Drug Administration or Na-
tional Cancer Institute are conducting or sponsoring assessment proce-
dures to determine the safety and efficacy of the procedure or
substantially similar procedures, or of any part of such procedures.
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row transplant procedures are not experimental is to be made by
the Florida Agency of Health Care Administration, based upon
the recommendations of an advisory panel consisting of oncolo-
gists, consumer representatives, and insurance representatives.P''
The law further delineates a series of factors that are to be con-
sidered by the advisory panel and the director of the Agency in
making their determinations.P! Finally, the panel must conduct a
review of scientific evidence, minimally on a biennial basis, to
ensure that its recommendations are consistent with the latest
available data.'s2
The Florida statute thus provides for a thorough, professional,
and responsible decision-making process regarding which bone
marrow transplants are to be considered experimental. Never-
theless, the statute is narrow in scope and does not cover any
treatment other than bone marrow transplants. Moreover, it re-
quires a lengthy and exhaustive assessment of data to determine
that the procedure is not experimental within the meaning of the
law. It took Florida's Advisory Panel eighteen months after the
enactment of the statute to recommend mandatory coverage of
bone marrow transplants for Stage IV breast cancer that are con-
ducted as part of a clinical trial.'53 This time lag may be costly or
even constitute what is in essence a death sentence for patients
awaiting decisions regarding last-chance treatments.
C. Statutes Offering A Broader Solution to the Problem of
Health Insurance Benefits for
Experimental Treatments
Rhode Island!" and California'f" have enacted statutes that
3. Consider practices of providers with respect to requesting or requiring
patients to sign a written acknowledgment that a bone marrow trans-
plant procedure is experimental.
(e) The advisory panel shall conduct, at least biennially, a review of scien-
tific evidence to ensure that its recommendations are based on current re-
search findings and that insurance policies offer coverage for the latest
medically acceptable bone marrow transplant procedures. .
(4) Any rule adopted under this section apphes only to claims filed




lS3 Wolf, supra note 30, at 2100.
154 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-36.2 (1998).
155CAL. HEALTH & SAFETYCODE § 1370.4 (West 1997); CAL. Iss. CoDE
§ 10145.3 (West 1999).
...
232 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78, 1999]
do not address any particular treatment but offer a more far-
reaching solution to the problem of coverage for experimental
treatments, The Rhode Island and California statutes merit care-
ful analysis.
1. The Rhode Island Statute
Rhode Island compels insurers to reimburse patients for the
cost of cancer therapies that are still under investigation when
particular criteria are met.156 These criteria include: (1) the pa-
tient's participation in a Phase III or IV clinical trial which has
been approved by one of the entities specified in the statute and
a qualified institutional review board; (2) administration of the
156 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-36.2 (1998) provides:
Conditions of coverage. [Effective until December 31, 1999.]
As provided in § 27~18~36tcoverage shall be extended to new cancer
therapies still under investigation when the following circumstances are
present
(1) Treatment is being provided pursuant to a Phase IT, III, or IV clinical
trial which has been approved by the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
in cooperation with the National Cancer Institute (NCr), Community
clinical oncology programs; the Food and Drug Administration in the form
of an Investigational New Drug (IND) exemption; the Department of Vet-
erans' Affairs; or a qualified nongovernmental research entity as identified
in the guidelines for NCI cancer center support grants;
(2) The proposed therapy has been reviewed and approved by a qualified
institutional review board (IRB);
(3) The facility and personnel providing the treatment are capable of doing
so by virtue of their experience, training, and volume of patients treated to
maintain expertise;
(4) The patients receiving the investigational treatment meet all protocol
requirements;
(5) There is no clearly superior, non investigational alternative to the pro-
tocol treatment;
(6) The available clinical or preclinical data provide a reasonable expecta-
tion that the protocol treatment will be at least as efficacious as the
noninvestigational alternative; and
(7) The coverage of new cancer therapy treatment provided pursuant to a
Phase II clinical trial shall not be required for only that portion of that
treatment as is provided as part of the 'Phase U clinical trial and is other-
wise funded by a national agency, such as the national cancer institute, the
veteran's administration, the department of defense, or funded by commer-
cial organizations such as the biotechnical and/or pharmaceutical industry
or manufacturers of medical devices. Any portions of a Phase II trial
which are customarily funded by government, biotechnical and/or pharma-
ceutical and/or medical device industry sources in Rhode Island or in other
states shall continue to be so funded in Rhode Island and coverage pursu·
ant to this section shall supplement, not supplant, such customary funding.
[It should be noted that effective December 31, 1999 only Phase III and
IV clinical trials will be covered by the statute.]
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therapy by qualified, experienced personnel in an appropriate fa-
cility; (3) the patient's meeting all protocol requirements; and (4)
the absence of any clearly superior, nonexperimental
alternative.P?
a. Clinical Trials
Clinical trials for drugs and devices are regulated by the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA).IS8 Clinical trials for other
therapies such as surgery or bone marrow transplants, however,
are not regulated by the FDA and are conducted independently
by entities such as medical research centers.l" Drugs studied in
clinical trials are called investigational new drugs (IND).'60
Sponsors wishing to conduct a clinical trial to test a new drug
must submit IND Applications to the FDA.'6' In some circum-
stances, a drug still under investigation may be used to treat pa-
tients not participating in a clinical tria!.'62 Specifically, an IND
may be used in treatment of patients if the drug is intended to
treat a serious or immediately life-threatening disease and there
is no comparable or satisfactory alternative drug or therapy.'?"
The drug can be used in treatment if it is currently under investi-
gation in a clinical trial, or if clinical trials have been completed,
and the sponsor is actively pursuing marketing approval with due
diligence.l'"
Medical research for drugs and other treatments usually is con-
ducted in three phases of clinical trials."? In Phase I drug trials,
the new drug is given to patients or healthy individuals to deter-
mine its toxicity, most effective method of administration, and
safe dosage range. 1M Participants in the trial receive increasing
157Id .
. 15821 C.F.R. § 7.3(f) (1999) ('''Product' means an article subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Food and Drug Administration, including any food, drug, and device
intended for human or animal use .... '').
159 Saver, supra note 2, at 1110-11. Saver states that "a great deal of potentially
efficacious treatment is left unscrutinized by government agencies." ld. at 1111; see
also Daniels & Sabin, supra note 48, at 29 ("[T]he 'gatekeeper' for ABMT [is]
not the FDA, charged with keeping unsafe pharmaceuticals off the market ").
16021C.F.R. § 312.23(a) (1999).
161Id.
16221 C.F.R. § 312.34(a).
163Id. § 312.34(b)(I)(i)-(ii).
164Id. § 312.34(b)(I)(iii)-(iv). . .
165 Henry, supra note 74, at 621; see also Dahl~Eimers v, Mutual of Omaha LIfe
Ins. Co., 812 F. Supp. 1193, 1196 (N.D. Fla. 1992); 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (1999).
16621 C.F.R. § 312.21(a); Henry, supra note 74, at 621.
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dosages of the substance until a dosage is reached where toxici-
ties are determined to be unacceptable.l'" Phase I clinical trials
generally involve only twenty to eighty subjects, last about a
year, and have a very high failure rate.'6B Seventy percent of
drugs submitted for Phase I clinical trials fail to progress to Phase
II.'69
Phase II trials are designed to determine the effectiveness of
the therapy.!"" The treatment is administered to patients af-
flicted by the disease for which the therapy is intended, and the
trial often involves 100 to 300 people and lasts about two
years.'?' Approximately thirty-three percent of drugs submitted
for clinical trials fail in Phase II testing.'?"
Phase III clinical trials are conducted only after the treatment
has proven effective through Phase I and II trials."? The third
phase attempts to assess the medical result of the experimental
therapy in comparison with standard therapy or no therapy at
all.'?" Phase III studies usually involve 1000 to 3000 patients and
last about three years.':"
The FDA may also require postmarketing or Phase IV clinical
trials.'?" These studies are designed to determine the existence
of less common adverse reactions, the effect of the drug on mor-
bidity or mortality, or the effect of the drug on a particular pa-
tient population, such as children."?"
Research that is funded in whole or in part by the Department
of Health and Human Services or that is regulated by the FDA
or another federal agency must be reviewed by an Institutional
Review Board (IRB)PB The IRB receives a research proposal
regarding each clinical trial. The proposal describes eligibility re-
quirements for participants, the number of subjects to be tested,
167Dahl-Eimers, 812 F. Supp. at 11%.
16821 C.F.R. § 312.21(a); Henry, supra note 74, at 621.
169Henry, supra note 74, at 621.
170Dahl-Eimers, 812 F. Supp. at 1196; 21 e.F.R. § 312.21(b).
17121 C.F.R. § 312.21(b); Henry, supra note 74, at 621.
172Henry, supra Dote 74, at 621.
17321 C.F.R. § 312.21(c).
174Dahl-Eimers, 812 F. Supp. at 1196; 21 e.F.R. § 312.21(c).
175 Henry, supra note 74, at 621.
1761d. at 622.
1771d.
17845 e.F.R. § 46.101(a) (1998); Richard S. Saver, Critical Care Research and In-
formed Consent, 75 N.C. L. REv. 205, 215-16 (1996).
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and the objective of the research.F? Each participant must pro-
vide "informed consent" to participate in the trial."?
The Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR), the
ethics-oversight branch of the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS), has project-assurance contracts with 420 insti-
tutions in North America, including 127 U.S. medical schools.P"
On average, medical schools review 350 to 540 new research pro-
tocols each year, which call for the recruitment of between 10,000
and 20,000 subjects for biomedical research.l'" The FDA is re-
sponsible for the oversight of approximately 1200 IRBs, many of
which are simultaneously regulated by NIH through multiple
project-assurance agrecments.!" These include hospitals, non-
profit committees, and for-profit IRBs that contract with various
researchers who often work for pharmaceutical, medical device,
and biotech companies.l'"
The Rhode Island statute allows patients to benefit from pro-
cedures that are still in investigation only if the patient partici-
pates in an IRB-approved clinical trial. The statute also clearly
defines which "experimental" therapies must be covered by in-
surers. Consequently, insurers are not asked or encouraged to
pay for any and all unsubstantiated treatments. As will be dis-
cussed below, this Article proposes federal legislation that
adopts, in part, the Rhode Island statutory standards. While the
Rhode Island legislation pertains only to cancer therapies, the
proposed federal legislation would apply to treatments for any
terminal disease likely to cause death within two years.l'" In ad-
dition, the federal legislation would apply only to Phase III stud-
ies.'86 Phase IV trials are not addressed specifically in the
proposed federal statute because such studies constitute research
on drugs approved by the FDA.'87 The cost of these approved
drugs should be covered by insurance in accordance with plan
policies, or if the drug use in question is off-label, reimbursement
17921 C.F.R. § 56.115 (1999); 45 C.F.R. § 46.115.
18021 C.F.R. § 50.20; 45 C.F.R. § 46.116.
181 HAROLD Y. VANDERPOOL, THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
SUBJECTS: FACING THE 21STCENTURY 12 (1996).
IrQ [d.
183 [d.
184 [d. at 12-13.
185 See infra Part V.
186Prior to December 31. 1999, the Rhode lsland statute also mandated coverage
for Phase II clinical trials. R.I. GEN. LAws § 27-18-36.2 (1998).
187 VANDERPOOL, supra note 181, at 214.
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would be handled pursuant to the off-label drug use provision
discussed in Part V.A.2 below.
2. The California Statute
In addition to a statute that mandates reimbursement for the
treatment of cancer by bone marrow transplants.l'" California
has enacted legislation that more broadly regulates denials of
coverage for experimental treatments by insurers. The statute,
known as the Friedman-Knowles Experimental Treatment Act,
was passed in 1996.'89 The California law mandates that after
July 1, 1998,'90 health benefits plans provide an independent, ex-
pert review of any decision to deny coverage for experimental or
investigational treatments for patients with terminal conditions
that are likely to cause death within two years and for which
there is no effective therapy.'?'
188 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123985 (WeS! 1995); CAL. WELF, & INST,
CODE § 14133.8 (West 1995).
189CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.4 note (West Supp. 1999) (Historical
and Statutory Notes).
190CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.4(g) (West Supp. 1999).
191CAL, HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 1370.4 (West Supp, 1999) is too lengthy to
quote in its entirety, but provides in part as follows:
(a) Every health care service plan shall provide an external, independent
review process to examine the plan's coverage decisions regarding experi-
mental or investigational therapies for individual enrollees who meet all of
the following criteria:
(1) The enrollee has a terminal condition that, according to the en-
rollee's physician's current diagnosis, has a high probability of causing
death within two years from the date of the request for an independent
review; and
(2) The enrollee's physician certifies that the enrollee has a condition, as
defined in paragraph (1), for which standard therapies have not been effec-
tive in improving the condition of the enrollee, or for which standard thera-
pies would not be medically appropriate for the enrollee, or for which there
is no more beneficial standard therapy covered by the plan than the ther-
apy proposed pursuant to paragraph (3); and
(3) Either (A) the enrollee's physician, who is under contract with or
employed by the plan, has recommended a drug, device, procedure or
other therapy that the physician certifies in writing is likely to be more
beneficial to the enrollee than any available standard therapies, or (B) the
enrollee, or the enrollee's physician who is a licensed, board-certified or
board-eligible physician qualified to practice in the area of practice appro-
priate to treat the enrollee's condition, has requested a therapy that, based
on two documents from the medical and scientific evidence, as defined in
subdivision (d), is likely to be more beneficial for the enrollee than any
available standard therapy. The physician certification pursuant to this
subdivision shall include a statement of the evidence relied upon by the
physician in certifying his or her recommendation. Nothing in this subdivi-
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The insurer and not the patient pays for the cost of the in-
dependent review.l'" The experts on the panel must generally
provide their recommendations within thirty days of receiving
the patient's request for review and within seven days if the treat-
ment must be administered immediately in order to be effec-
tive."? The panel's decision is determined by majority vote.'?"
sian shall be construed to require the plan to pay for the services of a non-
participating physician provided pursuant to this subdivision, that are not
otherwise covered pursuant 1O the plan contract; and
(4) The enrollee has been denied coverage by the plan for a drug, de-
vice, procedure or other therapy recommended or requested pursuant to
paragraph (3); and
(5) The specific drug, device, procedure or other therapy recommended
pursuant to paragraph (3) would be a covered service, except for the plan's
determination that the therapy is experimental or investigational; and
(6) This section shall not apply to any Medi-Cal beneficiary enrolled in a
health care service plan under the plan's contract with the Medi-Cal
program.
(b) The plan's external, independent review shall meet the following
criteria:
(1) the plan shall offer all enrollees who meet the criteria in subdivision
(a) the opportunity to have the requested therapy reviewed under the ex-
ternal, independent review process. The plan shall notify eligible enrollees
in writing of the opportunity to request the external independent review
within five business days of the decision to deny coverage.
(2) The plan shall contract with one or more impartial, independent en-
tities that are accredited pursuant to subdivision (c). The entity shall ar-
range for review of the coverage decision by selecting an independent
panel of at least three physicians or other providers who are experts in the
treatment of the enrollee's medical condition and knowledgeable about the
recommended therapy. If the entity is an academic medical center accred-
ited in accordance with subdivision (e), the independent panel may include
experts affiliated with or employed by the entity. A panel of two experts
may be arranged at the plan's request, provided the enrollee consents in
writing. The independent entity may arrange for a panel of one expert only
if the independent entity certifies in writing that there is only one expert
qualified and able to review the recommended therapy. Neither the plan
nor the enrollee shall choose or control the choice of the physician or other
provider experts.
See also CAL. INS. CODE § 10145.3 (West Supp. 1999) (applying similar terms to
disability insurers).
192 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.4(b)(5) (West Supp. 1999) ("The en-
rollee shall not be required to pay for the external, independent review. The costs of
the review shall be horne by the plan."). .
193 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.4(b)(7) (West Supp. 1999) provides;
The experts on the panel shall render their analyses and reco~endations
within 30 days of the receipt of the enrollee's request for review. ~f~e
enrollee's physician determines that the proposed therapy would be signifi-
cantly less effective if not promptly initiated, the analys,es,and recommen-
dations of the experts on the panel shall be rendered Within seven days of
the request for expedited review. At the request of the expert, the dead-
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Reimbursement for the therapy is mandated if the majority of
the experts recommend a provision of the treatment or if their
recommendations are evenly split, but not if only a minority of
the experts conclude that the treatment should be covered by the
plan.':"
The Friedman-Knowles Experimental Treatment Act provides
a mechanism for decision-making without determining what the
decisions should be.196 Subscribers are given the opportunity to
turn to an external panel of specialists for an independent opin-
ion if they are dissatisfied with the insurer's decision-making
process.'?"
Opponents might argue that the option of appeal will signifi-
cantly increase healthcare costs and disrupt the provider's ability
to manage care.'?" These concerns may be quelled, however, by
the experience of Northern California Kaiser Permanente, which
utilized an independent review process before the legislation was
enacted in Califomia.P? From 1994 to 1996 only six of the 2.5
million Northern California Kaiser members sought external re-
view.2oo Scholars studying Kaiser's results have concluded that
"[w]hen the patients' concerns about insurer trustworthiness and
potential conflict of interest were addressed in advance by the
option of going outside of Kaiser for independent consultation,
patients and families were much readier to enter into a reflective
dialogue with their Kaiser physicians about what treatment ap-
proach really made sense to them. "201 Kaiser's appeal option
line shall be extended by up to three days for a delay in providing the
documents required by paragraph (6) of subdivision (b).
194 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370.4(b)(10) (West Supp. 1999) provides:
If the majority of experts on the panel recommend providing the proposed
therapy, pursuant to paragraph (8), the recommendation shall be binding
on the plan. If the recommendations of the experts on the panel are evenly
divided as to whether the therapy should be provided, then the panel's
decision shall be deemed to be in favor of coverage. If less than a majority
of the experts on the panel recommend providing the therapy, the plan is
not required to provide the therapy. Coverage for the services required
under this section shall be provided subject to the terms and conditions
generally applicable to other benefits under the plan contract.
1951d.
196 Daniels & Sabin, supra note 48, at 27, 34.
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thus neither proved expensive nor disruptive to its ability to man-
age care.
Texas had a similar experience when it experimented with an
independent review procedure. In 1997, Texas implemented leg-
islation that allowed subscribers to utilize an independent ap-
peals process for review of HMO decisions.i'" While the Texas
Insurance Department predicted as many as 4400 appeals during
the first year, only 218 had been filed just over a year after the
law's effective date,z03 This figure should provide further assur-
ances to those concerned about the cost of autonomous appeals
procedures. It should be noted, however, that the independent
review provision of the Texas statute was deemed preempted by
ERISA and struck down by a federal district court on September
23, 1998.204 Subsequently, Aetna Life & Casualty Co. has at-
tempted to devise a review mechanism that would be immune to
ERISA preemption and was reported to be working with the
state attorney general's office to delay implementation of the
court's order.P" Here the insurance company itself sought to sal-
vage the independent review procedure.
The proposed federal legislation suggested here would require
insurers to offer an external, independent review of any decision
to deny coverage to a terminally ill patient for investigational
treatments administered in a Phase III clinical trial. Thus, for
example, if the plan determined that a patient did not meet pro-
tocol requirements or that a clearly superior nonexperimental al-
ternative was available to the subscriber, the negative coverage
decision could, at the patient's option, be reviewed by the in-
dependent panel of experts. This review would, in most in-
stances, prevent both the insurer and terminally ill patients from
having to endure costly, lengthy, and emotionally draining court
battles.
D. The Weaknesses of State Legislation
The federal legislation proposed in this Article would not over-
turn or preempt state laws that mandate reimbursement for par-
202 Carol Marie Cropper, In Texas, a Laboratory Test on the Effects of Suing
H.M.O.'s, N.Y. TlMES,Sept. 13, 1998, at 0.
203 [d.
204Corporate Health Ins. Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597 (S.D. Tex.
1998); see also discussion of ERISA preemption infra Part IILD.2.
205 Renae Merle, Aetna, State Join Forces to Put Off HMO Ruling, HOUSTON
CHRON.• Sept. 23, 1998, at C4.
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ticular treatments or require insurers to offer certain coverage
for an addi tional cost as long as no conflict exists between the
state and federal laws. Rather, the federal law would create a
national, minimal standard that all insurers would have to meet,
namely, coverage of off-label drug uses and treatment provided
in Phase III clinical trials in appropriate circumstances. Nothing
would prevent the states from requiring additional coverage from
insurers, and nothing would hinder health plans from volunteer-
ing to establish more liberal coverage provisions. Federal legisla-
tion is necessary, however, because of a number of significant
weaknesses inherent in the state statutes discussed above.
1. State Mandates Benefit A Limited Patient Population
State legislation that focuses on a particular treatment for a
specific disease affects only a small number of patients who need
the therapy at issue and live in the state that enacted the law.206
In addition, and as mentioned above, legislation addressing par-
ticular treatments may be the product of lobbying efforts by in-
terest groups"? or of high profile cases that have come to the
attention of the legislature.P" The Assembly Insurance Commit-
tee Statement regarding the New Jersey law mandating reim-
bursement for the treatment of Wilm's tumor by HDC-ABMT
illustrates this point. It states in relevant part:
This bill has been referred to as the "Tishna Rollo Bill."
Tishna Rollo is an eight-year-old Glen Ridge girl who is bat-
tling Wilm's tumor, a rare form of cancer which generally af-
fects the kidneys before spreading to other parts of the body.
Recently, Tishna's case has received much attention because
her doctors have concluded that the transplants are the one
chance they have to cure her disease, yet her family's health
insurer initially refused to provide coverage for the treatment
because it asserted that such treatment was not covered in her
health insurance contract as it is considered "experimental" or
"investigational." Court action on the issue is pending. This
bill will eliminate the controversy surrounding the treatment
and, in effect, absolve health insurers, and ultimately the
courts, of the responsibility of making any determination re-
garding this issue?09
Not every patient, however, will have access to the media or
206 See Collins, supra Dote 10, at 481-82.
207 Hsia, supra note 11, at 552.
208 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-61 Dote (West 1996) (Assembly Insurance Com-
mittee Statement).
209 [d.
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capture the legislature's attention. If states continue to address
treatments on a piecemeal, case-by-case basis, many opportuni-
ties to save lives will be lost. Legislative debates are lengthy and
legislative enactments are limited in number. Consequently, it is
necessary to address the problem of coverage for experimental
treatments more broadly. Federal legislation requiring reim-
bursement for any treatment administered to appropriate termi-
nally ill patients in Phase III clinical trials will provide life-saving
opportunities for patients regardless of their geographic location,
their illness, or the therapy at issue.
2. Limitations UnderERISA
ERISA 210 applies to most employer provided health insurance
policies."! State mandates regarding treatment coverage may be
of no help to patients utilizing self-funded employee benefit
plans because ERISA preempts state legislation as it pertains to
self-funded plans.?"
ERISA's preemption clause states that "[e[xccpt as provided
in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter
21029 V.S.c. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
211 Specifically, ERISA's coverage provision, 29 V.S.c. § 1003, reads in relevant
part as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and in sections
1051, 1081, and 1101 of this title, this subchapter shall apply to any em-
ployee benefit plan if it is established or maintained-
(1) by any employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity
affecting commerce; or
(2) by any employee organization or organizations representing employ-
ees engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce;
or
(3) by both.
(b) 'The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any employee
benefit plan if-
(1) such plan is a governmental plan (as defined in section 1002(33) of
this title); . .
(2) such plan is a church plan (as defined in section 1002(33) of this title]
with respect to which no election has been made under section 410( d) of
title 26;
(3) such plan is maintained solely for the purpose of complying with ap-
plicable workmen's compensation laws or unemployment compensation or
disability insurance laws; . .
(4) such plan is maintained outside of the United States primarily for the
benefit of persons substantially all of whom are nonresident aliens; or
(5) such plan is an excess benefit plan (as defined in section 1002(36) of
this title) and is unfunded.
212 See Hardester, supra note 7, at 298; Maggio, supra note 44, at 564.
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and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan described in section lO03(a) of this title
and not exempt under section lOO3(b) of this title."Z13 Therefore,
actions brought against insurers based upon contract, tort, and
other theories have been deemed preempted by ERISA.ZI4
The statute includes a significant exception to the above-
quoted provision. ERISA's savings clause provides that the Act
does not preempt state laws that regulate insurance, banking, or
securities.P" In light of this savings clause, the Supreme Court
held that a Massachusetts law mandating that group insurance
companies provide specified minimum health care benefits was
not preempted by ERISA.216
The exception, however, is not global. ERISA's "deemer
clause'F'? establishes that state laws regulating insurance, bank-
ing, and securities, are not exempted from ERISA's preemption
clause with respect to self-funded health insurance plans.P"
State laws regulating health insurance, therefore, could not be
enforced with respect to self-funded plans pursuant to ERISA's
preemption clause. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has deter-
mined, for example, that ERISA preempted application of the
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law to self-
213 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
214 See Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992); Brun-
dage-Peterson v. Compcare Health Servs. Ins. Corp .• 877 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989).
In the Corcoran case, the defendant denied Mrs. Corcoran precertification for a
hospital stay during her high-risk pregnancy. Instead, it allowed 10 hours a day of
home nursing care. Subsequently, the fetus went into distress and died during a time
when no nurse was present. The Fifth Circuit held that ERISA preempted the plain-
tiffs' medical malpractice claim and precluded recovery of emotional distress
damages.
21529 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) ("Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing
in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law
of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities. ").
216 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
217 See id, at 735 n.14.
21829 USC. § 1144(b)(B) provides:
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this
title, which is not exempt under section lOO3(b) of this title (other than a
plan established primarily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor
any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance
company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or
to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any
law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance
contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
_. ..... .._ •.. _,._~'"'"'".•_.•' ........v.. _'..~.'.' ....', ,.• ' '&. ,,,,_,, • ''''' ....... ''~ •• ':!:.~.~._ ..,.- .• ",. '......, , :''':.;>' ~l'
Insurance Coverage for Experimental and Investigational Treatments 243
funded health benefits plans."? Similarly, it is likely that the
courts would find that a state statute mandating coverage for a
particular treatment is preempted by ERISA with respect to self-
funded health insurance policies.
3. Limitations Under The Americans With DisabilitiesAct
Health insurance provisions that provide coverage for bone
marrow transplants or other "experimental" treatments in some
instances and not others are vulnerable to attack under the
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)PO If an insurer pro-
vides reimbursement for HDC-ABMT for Wilm's tumor or
breast cancer but not other cancers, the coverage disparity may
be deemed discriminatory under the ADA, even if it is supported
by state law. Because federal law preempts state law,221 the
existence of a state statutory mandate may not shield the em-
ployer from ADA liability. In order to avoid including unlawful
disability-based distinctions in their health insurance plans, em-
ployers may therefore be forced to eliminate coverage of the
treatment at issue pursuant to federal law and consequently undo
the limited good that state law attempted to achieve.
The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against
qualified individuals with disabilities with respect to job applica-
tion procedures, hiring, promotion, termination of employees,
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.P? The phrase "other terms, condi-
tions and privileges of employment" includes all fringe benefits,
such as health insurance, that are available by virtue of employ-
ment, whether or not such benefits are administered by the em-
ployer.223 Consequently, liability may be imposed under the
ADA upon an employer that offers its employees an insurance
plan that is found to be discriminatory, and therefore, employer-
provided health insurance policies must comply with the ADA's
requirements.
219 FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) ("We read the deerner c~auseto
exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that 'regulat[e] Insurance within
the meaning of the saving clause."); see also Metropolitan Life, 471U.S. at 735 n.l4.
22042 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)
221See Hillsborougb County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs Inc., 471 u.s, 7m, 713
(1985) ("We have beld repeatedly that state laws can be pre-empted by federal regu-
lations as well as by federal statutes."); McDermott v, Wisconsm, 228 U.S. 115, 132
(1913).
22242 U.S.c. § 12112(a).
223 See 29 C.ER. § 1630.4 (1998).
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The anti-discrimination mandates of the ADA do not prohibit
insurers from limiting insurance coverage based on risk classifica-
tion and underwriting principles.F" The regulations promulgated
under the ADA state that the law is not designed to disrupt the
practices of underwriting, classifying, and administering risks,
which are integral to the insurance industry:
(1) An insurer ... may underwrite risks, classify risks, or ad-
minister such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with
State law.
(2) A covered entity may establish, sponsor, observe or ad-
minister the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based
on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such
risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law225
The legislative history of the ADA also suggests that Congress
intended to allow insurance providers to continue limiting cover-
age in particular situations based upon legitimate risk assessment
calculations:
While a plan which limits certain kinds of coverage based on
classification of risk would be allowed under this section, the
plan may not refuse to insure, or refuse to continue to insure,
or limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage available to an
individual, or charge a different rate for the same coverage
solely because of a physical or mental impairment, except
where the refusal, limitation, or rate differential is based on
sound actuarial principles or is related to actual or reasonably
anticipated experience.F"
However, the vague regulations and legislative history provide
no guidance as to how insurers may assess and classify risks so
that an insurance plan with coverage limitations remains consis-
tent with the ADA's non-discrimination mandate. In an effort to
resolve some of the questions relating to insurance coverage
under the ADA, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) issued its "EEOC Interim Guidance on Applica-
tion of ADA to Health Insurance" (the Guidelines) on June 8,
1993.227
The Guidelines identify four fundamental requirements im-
posed by the ADA upon employers that offer their employees
health insurance benefits:
22429 C.F.R. § 1630.16(f).
225 !d.
226 S. Rep.No. 101-116, at 85 (1989).
227EEOC interim Guidance on Application of ADA to Health insurance, EEOC
Compl. Man. (BNA) No. 176 (June 8, 1993) (hereinafter Guidelines).
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(1) Disability-based insurance distinctions are acceptable
under the ADA only if the employer-provided insurance plan
is bona fide and if the distinctions are not used as a subterfuge
for purpose of evading the Act;
(2) Employment decisions regarding an individual with a disa-
bility cannot be motivated by concerns about the individual's
impact on the employer's health plan;
(3) Employees with disabilities must enjoy equal access to
whatever health insurance is provided to non-disabled em-
ployees; and
(4) The employer cannot make an employment decision re-
garding an individual if the decision is motivated by concern
about how the disability of someone with whom the candidate
has a relationship will impact its health plan,>28
A term or provision is "disability-based" if it isolates a particular
disability, a discrete group of disabilities, or disabilities in general
(e.g., exclusion from coverage of all conditions that substantially
limit a major life activity), or if it affects treatment of disabili-
ties.229 Thus, an insurance plan that contains a coverage exclu-
sion for the treatment of certain cancers by HDC-ABMT but
allows the treatment of other cancers via that therapy may con-
tain an unlawful disability-based distinction.F"
If a term or provision of a health insurance plan is found to be
disability-based, the employer bears the burden of proving that
the provision does not violate the ADA.231 To do so the em-
ployer must establish the following: (1) the challenged health in-
surance plan is a bona fide insurance plan that is not inconsistent
with applicable state law or is a bona fide self-insured plan under
ERISA; and (2) the disability-based distinction is not being used
as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADA.232
An employer can prove that a disability-based distinction is
not a subterfuge in a variety of ways. First, the employer may
228/d.
229 ld.
230Henderson v.Bodine Aluminum, Inc.70 F.3d 958, 960 (8th Cir. 1995).
231 Guidelines, supra note 227.
232 Id. The language reads as follows:
b. The respondent may prove that the disparate treatment is justifi.~d by
legitimate actuarial data, or by actual or reasonably anticipated expenence,
and that conditions with comparable actuarial data and/or expenence are
treated in the same fashion, In other words, the respondent may prove that
the disability-based disparate treatment is attributable to the appl~cation of
legitimate risk classification and underwriting procedures to the increased
risks (and thus increased cost to the health insurance plan) of the disability,
and not to the disability per se.
ld, (footnotes omitted).
,.,;; ." , ~ ,-~~' •• ", 1 ··"" • -, ' "', ~," • - "" ~ _ n - •• __ ••• _ , •• ,",,-,_,",~ ~ "'.~ ,
246 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78, 1999]
establish that the coverage limitation is actuarially or economi-
cally justified.P" That is, the EEOC interprets the ADA to re-
quire that services posing similar risks of financial loss to a plan,
whether as an actuarial or economic matter, be covered in a like
manner. Consequently, a plan that offers coverage for HDC-
ABMT to treat some cancers but not others may be perceived as
implementing a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the ADA if
the bone marrow transplant costs the same in all instances.
In addition, the Guidelines provide that the employer may
prove that a disability-based distinction does not constitute sub-
terfuge by establishing that the coverage exclusion was necessary
to prevent the financial insolvency of the plan234 or that the dis-
tinction was needed to "prevent the occurrence of an unaccept-
able change either in the coverage of the health insurance plan,
or in the premiums charged for the health insurance plan. "235
An "unacceptable change" is a drastic increase in premium or
other payments or an extreme change in the scope or level of
coverage that would render the plan effectively unavailable to a
233 Id.
234[d. The Guidelines provide:
c. The respondent may prove that the disparate treatment is necessary
(i.e., that there is no nondisability-based health insurance plan change that
could be made) to ensure that the challenged health insurance plan satisfies
the commonly accepted or legally required standards for the fiscal sound-
ness of such an insurance plan, The respondent, for example, may prove
that it limited coverage for the treatment of a discrete group of disabilities
because continued unlimited coverage would have been so expensive as to
cause the health insurance plan to become financially insolvent, and there
was no nondisability-based health insurance plan alteration that would
have avoided insolvency.
Id.
235 [d. The Guidelines state:
d. The respondent may prove that the challenged insurance practice or
activity is necessary (t:e., that there is no nondisability-based change that
could be made) to prevent the occurrence of an unacceptable change either
in the coverage of the health insurance plan, or in the premiums charged
for the health insurance plan. An "unacceptable" change is a drastic in-
crease in premium payments (or in co-payments or deductibles), or a dras-
tic alteration to the scope of coverage or level of benefits provided, that
would: 1) make the health insurance plan effectively unavailable to a signif-
icant number of other employees, 2) make the health insurance plan so
unattractive as to result in significant adverse selection, or 3) make the
health insurance plan so unattractive that the employer cannot compete in
recruiting and maintaining qualified workers due to the superiority of
health insurance plans offered by other employers in the community.
/d. (footnote omitted).
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significant number of employees.F" An "unacceptable change"
also may be one that causes the plan to be so unattractive that
only poor-risklhigh-use enrollees select the plan, while good-risk!
low-use enrollees select other options so that the plan ultimately
becomes financially unsound or not viable."? Finally, an "unac-
ceptable change" is one that causes the plan to become so unat-
tractive that the employer finds itself unable to compete with
other employers who offer superior health programs because it
cannot maintain or recruit qualified workers.F"
The Guidelines also specify that the employer may prove that
the treatment for which reimbursement was denied by the plan is
of no medical benefit for patients.239 The Guidelines do not,
however, provide an explicit defense for employers based on the
status of the excluded treatment as experimental or
investigational.
Employees have in fact sued their employers''" alleging ADA
violations with respect to coverage denials by health insurance
providers. In Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc. ,241 a breast
cancer patient, insured under an ERISA health plan, sought a
preliminary injunction compelling the plan to provide coverage
for HDC-ABMT on the theory that the plan's denial of coverage
constituted discrimination under the ADA.242 The Eighth Cir-




239 Id. The relevant provision reads as follows:
e. Where the charging party is challenging the respondent's denial of
coverage for a disability-specific treatment, the respondent may prove that
this treatment does not provide any benefit (i.e., has no medical value).
The respondent, in other words, may prove by reliable scientific evidence
that the disability-specific treatment does not cure the condition, slow the
degeneration/deterioration or harm attributable to the condition, alleviate
the symptoms of the condition, or maintain the current health status of
individuals with the disability who receive the treatment.
ld. (footnote omitted).
240 Since the ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against disabled em-
ployees, subscribers generally sue the employer providing benefits rather than the
insurer directly. However, one court of appeals held that insurers may be actmg as
employers under the ADA when they administer benefits plans, and therefore they
may be sued directly. Carparts Distribution Ctr. Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's
Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12 (1st Clr. 1994); see alsa Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F.
Supp. 1316 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that the ADA prohibited denial of insurance to
person whose spouse had AIDS).
24170 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1995).
2421d. at 959.
....
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manded the case.243 Citing the EEOC's guidelines, the court
based its decision on the fact that the plaintiff's plan covered
HDC-ABMT for other types of cancer and concluded that the
therapy is "accepted treatment for breast cancer"?" and a "sig-
nificant improvement over standard chemotherapy.t'<" The
court thus rejected the defendant's claim that the procedure was
experimental for breast cancer.
It is likely that in the future many more cases based on an
ADA theory will reach the courts. Patients who realize that a
promising treatment is covered by their plan for some forms of
cancer, for example, but not for the cancer with which they are
afflicted, will turn to the courts for redress of the apparent dis-
crimination. As noted above, the fact that the insurer's decision
to pay for a treatment for one kind of cancer but not another was
in compliance with state law may not serve as an effective de-
fense because under the principle of preemption, state law must
give way to federal legislation where a conflict exists between the
twO.246 Ironically, in order to avoid a violation of the ADA, em-
ployers may be forced to treat all experimental therapies in a
consistent fashion and exclude coverage of all such treatments,
including those that are the subject of state legislation. Thus, in
many instances the state coverage mandates may be deemed to
be in conflict with and preempted by the ADA.
In contrast, federal legislation mandating coverage for all ex-
perimental treatment provided to appropriate patients in Phase
III clinical trials would be fully consistent with the ADA. Under
a federal law, patients would not be subjected to disability-based
discrimination because terminally ill patients could receive reim-
bursement regardless of their illness and the therapy at issue so
long as the statute's coverage criteria were met.
IV
THE CASE FOR FEDERAL REGULATION
A. The Traditional Role of the States
In 1945, in the McCarran-Ferguson Act,247 Congress delegated
243ld. at 962.
244 u. at 960.
2451d. at 96l.
246McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
24715U.S.C. §§ 1101-1015 (1994).
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to the states regulatory responsibility for insurance markets.v"
The Act exempted health insurance markets from federal anti-
trust prosecution so long as the states regulated those markets.r"
Most states enacted regulations designed to ensure that insur-
ers remained solvent.F" Neither the states nor the federal gov-
ernment paid significant attention to issues of health policy or
effective competition until the 1970s.251 This may be explained,
in part, by the fact that prior to the mid-1970s the insurance in-
dustry was eager to expand health care services and cooperated
with policy makers in promoting this goaI.252 After the mid-
1970s, however, the industry's emphasis shifted to controlling
health care costS?53 In this environment, the federal government
has become increasingly active in regulating the healthcare
industry.
B. The Advent of Federal Legislation
1. The HMO Act
The HMO Act254 was the first major federal legislation in the
arena of health insurance regulation.255 The HMO Act pro-
moted competition and encouraged the development of qualify-
ing HMOs by overriding state statutory and common-law
24815U.S.c. § 1012. The statute provides:
(a) State regulatiou
The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be
subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or
taxation of such business.
(b) Federal regulation
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such
Act specifically relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after
June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman
Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, as amended [15 U.S.C.A. 41 et seq.], shall be applicable to the
business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by
State law,
249 15 U.S,C. § 1012.
250Len M. Nichols & Linda J. Blumberg, A Different Kind of 'New Federalism'?
The Health insurance Portability And Accountability Act of 1996, HEALTH AFFAIRS,
May/June 1998, at 25, 27,
2SI/d.
252 Mark A. Hall & Gerald F. Anderson. Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical
Necessity, 140 U. PA. L, REv. 1637, 1663 (1992),
253/d.
25442 U.S.c. §§ 300e - 300e-17 (1994).
255 Nichols & Blumberg, supra note 250, at 27.
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prohibitions regarding the operation of prepaid group practices
and the corporate practice of medicine.P" The HMO Act also
mandated that employers with more than twenty-five employees
that offer at least one health insurance plan also offer employees
the option of membership in a qualified HMO.257 In addition,
the law originally offered start-up loans and loan guarantees to
new HMOs that met particular requirernents.F" The HMO Act
sought to assure that qualifying HMOs will be able to compete
for the business of private employers.P?
2. ERISA
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ER-
ISA)260 enables employers, unions, and some groups of employ-
ers acting in concert to be exempt from state laws regulating
health insurance if their plans are self funded."? Employers that
choose to engage in the business of health insurance for their
employees and meet certain federal reporting and solvency re-
quirements are exempt from all state laws regulating the insur-
ance industry.F" ERISA, consequently, dramatically diminished
the ability of the states to regulate a significant portion of health-
care providers.
3. Medigap Reform
This legislation targets insurance plans that supplement Medi-
care coverage.P" Medicare provides no prescription drug cover-
age and no out-of-pocket maximum.F" As a result, a thriving
market developed for policies that would supplement Medicare
by offering benefits for uncovered services and beneficiary
copayment obligations.w' Seniors, eager to obtain maximum
health coverage for their multiplying ailments, often bought sev-
eral duplicative and low-value policies.P"
Congress determined that the Medigap market was not effec-
25642 U.S.c. § 300e-1O.
25742 U.S.C. § 300e-9.
25842 U.S.C. §§ 300e-4-300e-5.
259 Nichols & Blumberg, supra note 250, at 27.
26029 U.S.c. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
26129 U.S.c. § 1144(a).
262 Nichols & Blumberg, supra note 250, at 28,
2631d. The legislation is found at 42 U.S.c. § 1395ss (Supp. 1999).
264 Nichols & Blumberg, supra note 250, at 28.
265 !d.
266 !d.
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tively regulated by the states and acted to rectify its weaknesses
at the tederal Ievel."? In 1990,Congress responded to the confu-
sion created by the numerous policies offered in the "Medigap
market" by limiting the variety of Medigap plans that could be
offered to ten standardized policies, plans A_I.26S
4. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
To address other problems in the insurance market, Congress
enacted in 1996the Health Insurance Portability and Accounta-
bility Act (HIPAA),269 designed to increase the number of indi-
viduals who have and maintain health insurance coverage.F"
HIPAA requires that all group health plans, including ERISA
plans, limit to no more than twelve months their period of ex-
cluded coverage for preexisting conditions, that is, conditions for
which medical advice, diagnosis, care, or treatment was recom-
mended or received in the prior six months.?" In addition, group
insurers must generally credit enrollees for any time during
which they were previously excluded from coverage because of a
preexisting condition exclusion that was applied to them while
they were covered by a different insurer.272 HIPAA's portability
provisions guarantee that individuals covered by group insurance
at one employer for eighteen continuous months will be granted
I 273 Thiaccess to any group policy offered by a new emp oyer. s
portability requirement is designed to alleviate the concerns of
employees who were reluctant to leave current jobs for fear that
they will be denied health insurance by future employers because
of preexisting conditions.F"
HIPAA furthermore requires insurers operating in the small-
group marker-" to guarantee issue of all the products they offer
in the small-group market to all small groups and to all eligible
members of those groups, regardless of their health status?76
267Id.
268Id. at 29-30; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss.
26942 U.S.C. §§ 300gg _300gg-92 (Supp. 1999).
270 Nichols & Blumberg supra note 250, at 25.
27142 U.S.C. § 300gg(a). In the case of a late enrollee, the period of excluded
coverage may be extended to 18 months. Id,
Z72 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a), (c).
27342 U.S.C § 300gg-11.
274 Nichols & Blumberg, supra note 250, at 32.
275 Defined as consisting of two to fifty employees. 42 U.S.C § 300gg-91(e)(4),
(5).
27642U.S.C. § 300gg-11.
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The statute also requires all group carriers, in both large and
small group markets, to guarantee renewal of their products."?
Finally, HIPAA guaranteed the portability of group insurance
to individual insurance for certain individuals, Individuals are el-
igible under the following conditions: 1) they have had eighteen
months of continuous prior coverage with no coverage gap last-
ing longer than sixty-two days and have most recently had group
coverage; 2) they have exhausted any COBRA benefits available
to them and have no current access to group insurance or a pub-
lic program; and 3) they are eligible for some type of guaranteed
issue coverage in the individual market.?" The states retain the
ability to define the type of coverage available and to expand the
definition of "eligible individuals."?" HIPAA also requires that
all individual policy coverage be guaranteed renewable."?
One of the most well publicized provisions of the legislation is
an amendment that relates to minimal hospital stays following
childbirth.?" The provision prohibits insurers from restricting
hospital stays for new mothers to less than forty-eight hours fol-
lowing natural childbirth and less than ninety-six hours following
a cesarean section.F?
5. Coverage Mandates Related to Mastectomies
In 1998, Congress enacted the "Women's Health and Cancer
Rights Act of 1998," amending ERISA.283 The Act requires all
group health plans and health insurance issuers offering coverage
for mastectomies to provide reimbursement for reconstructive
surgery that is associated with a mastectomy.F"
In addition, several congressional bills have addressed the phe-
277 42 V.S.C. § 300gg-12.
27842 V.S.c. § 300gg-4I.
279Id.
28042 V.S.c. § 300gg-42.
28142 V.S.c. § 300gg-4(a) (Supp 1999).
282 !d.
28329 V.S.C. § 1185b (Supp. 1999).
28429 V.S.c. § 1185b(a) provides:
IN GENERAL.-A group health plan, and a health insurance issuer pro-
viding health insurance coverage in connection with a group health plan,
that provides medical and surgical benefits with respect to a mastectomy
shall provide, in a case of a participant or beneficiary who is receiving ben-
efits in connection with a mastectomy and who elects breast reconstruction
in connection with such mastectomy, coverage for-
(1) all stages of reconstruction of the breast on which the mastectomy
has been performed;
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nomenon of "drive-by mastectomies" in which patients are de-
nied coverage for a hospital stay of a full day or longer following
a mastectomy.i'" The proposals typically require that group
health plans provide coverage for an inpatient stay of a length of
time that is determined to be medically appropriate by the at-
tending physician in consultation with the patient undergoing the
mastectomy.f" Although none of these proposals has yet be-
come law, insurance coverage for hospitalization following a
mastectomy is likely to be regulated by federal legislation in the
near future.
C. Federal Legislation as a Trend
During the past several decades the federal government has
significantly eroded the power of the states to act as the exclusive
regulators of the health insurance market. The federal govern-
ment has identified particular problems that it perceived as re-
quiring uniform, national solutions, and has enacted legislation
that addressed the relevant policy issues.
Federal regulation has been praised by some and severely criti-
cized by others. HIPAA, for example, was hailed as the "first
national health policy with such far-reaching implications since
the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965."287 It has also
been denounced with the following words: "Liberals in Congress
(2) surgery and reconstruction of the other breast to produce a symmet-
rical appearance; and
(3) prostheses and physical complications of mastectomy, including
lymphedemas;
in a manner determined in consultation with the attending physician and
the patient. Such coverage may be subject to annual deductibles and coin-
surance provisions as may be deemed appropriate and as are consistent
with those established for other benefits under the plan or coverage. writ-
ten notice of the availability of such coverage shall be delivered to the par-
ticipant upon enrollment and annually thereafter.
2'" See H.R, 616, 105lh Cong., 1st Sess. (1997); S, 249, 105th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1997); S, 2330, 105th Cong., 2d Scss. § 715 (1998).
286 S. 2330 § 715(a)(I), for example, provides:
(1) IN GENERAL----A group health plan, and a health insurance issuer
providing health insurance coverage in connection with a group health
plan, that provides medical and surgical benefits shall ensure that ~pati~nt
coverage with respect to the surgical treatment of breast cancer (including
a mastectomy, lumpectomy, or lymph node dissection for the treatment of
breast cancer) is provided for a period of time as is dete~mined?y th.e
attending physician, in his or her professional judgment conSIStent with SCI-
entific evidence-based practices or guidelines, in consultation with the pa-
tient, to be medically appropriate. .
287 Nichols & Blumherg, supra note 250, at 26 (citing B.K. Atchmson & D.M. Fox,
....
,~"~" ""'l0·,~~--.~t;r '-.' .... '.~ ...... ~~......"._ ---:50__"-_~._.",_.__""~..__ ~..... '
254 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78, 1999]
and elsewhere, who have a clear vision of their goal of a govern-
ment-run and government-managed health care system, would
seize on any regulatory problem created by this legislation as an
excuse to extend federal regulation. "288
Such mixed feelings will surely be expressed about future fed-
eral legislation as well. A federal mandate regarding coverage
for experimental and investigational treatment, however, would
not constitute a radical departure from prior legislative
precedent.
1. The Clinton Health Plan
The Health Security Act (HSA),289 the health care legislation
proposed by President Clinton in 1993, addressed the problem of
exclusions for investigational and experimental treatment. The
HSA provided that a health plan may cover investigational treat-
ments if it chose to do SO.290 Insurers would have been author-
The Politics of the Health Insurance Portability and AccountabUity Act, HEALTIIAF-
FAIRS, May-June 1997, at 146-150).
288ld. at 26 (citing R.E. Moffit, What to Do about the Kassebaum-Kennedy Bill,
HERITAGE FOUND, ISSUEBULL., June 5, 1996, at 226).
2B9H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., Jst Sess. (J993); S. 1757, 103d Congo tst Sess. (J993).
290 H.R. 3600 § 1128 and S. 1757 § 1128 provided as follows:
(a) COVERAGE- Subject to subsection (b), tbe items and services de-
scribed in this subsection are qualifying investigational treatments that are
administered for a life- threatening disease, disorder, or other health condi-
tion (as defined by the National Health Board).
(b) DISCRETION OF PLAN- A health plan may cover an investiga-
tional treatment described in subsection (a) at its discretion.
(c) ROUTINE CARE DURING INVESTIGATIONAL TREAT-
MENTS- The comprehensive benefit package includes an item or service
described in any other section of this part, subject to the limitations and
cost sharing requirements applicable to the item or service, when the item
or service is provided to an individual in the course of an investigational
treatment, if-
(1) the treatment is a qualifying investigational treatment; and
(2) the item or service would have been provided to the individual even
if the individual were not receiving the investigational treatment
(d) DEFINITIONS- For purposes of this subtitle:
(1) QUALIFYING INVESTIGATIONAL TREATMENT- The term
'qualifying investigational treatment' means a treatment-
(A) the effectiveness of which has not been determined; and
(B) that is under clinical investigation as part of an approved research
trial.
(2) APPROVED RESEARCH TRIAL- The term 'approved research
trial' means-
(A) a research trial approved by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, the Director of the National Institutes of Health, the Commis-
sioner of the Food and Drug Administration, the Secretary of Veterans
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ized to cover only "qualifying investigational treatments that are
administered for a life-threatening disease," and the legislation
carefully defined the term "qualifying investigational treat-
ment.t??' In addition, the HSA mandated that health plans must
pay for items or services provided to a patient in the course of a
qualifying investigational treatment that would have been pro-
vided if the individual were receiving standard care rather than
undergoing an experimental therapy.F"
Clinton's ambitious reform initiative never became law, but it
was significant nevertheless because it identified the problem of
coverage for investigational treatments. This Article proposes a
stronger mandate regarding investigational treatment coverage
than did the HSA. Under the proposal, insurers would not be
given discretion as to whether to cover the costs of experimental
treatments so long as they were provided to appropriate patients
in Phase III clinical trials conducted by qualified institutions.
The federal legislation proposed here is not nearly as global as
the HSA. Rather, the suggested federal statute is narrowly tai-
lored to resolve the single issue of coverage for experimental
treatments, much as HIPAA addressed a limited number of spe-
cific problems. It is hoped that such legislation would meet far
greater success when considered by Congress than did the HSA.
2. Pending Legislation
Several healthcare reform bills were recently introduced in
Congress.s'" Among them is the Norwood-Dingell Bill, entitled
the "Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of
1999,"294 that includes a provision that mandates coverage of
clinical trials under some circumstances.295 This bill is more ex-
Affairs, the Secretary of Defense, or a qualified nongovernmental research
entity as defined in guidelines of the National Institutes of Health; or
(B) a peer-reviewed and approved research program, as defined hy the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, conducted for the pnmary pur-
pose of determining whether or not a treatment is safe, efficacious, or ha:-
ing any other characteristic of a treatment which must be demonstrated In
order for the treatment to be medically necessary or appropriate.
291 H.R. 3600 § 1128(d)(1); S. 1757 § 1128(d)(1),
292 H.R. 3600 § 1128; S, 1757 § 1128.
293 See, e.g., H.R. 2723, 106th Cong. 1st Sess. (1999); H.R. 2926, 106th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1999); H.R. 2990, l06th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999); H.R. 3110, l06th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1999).
294 H.R. 2723, l06th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
295H.R. 2723, § 119 provides as follows:
(a) Coverage.
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(1) In General. If a group health plan, or health insurance issuer that is
providing health insurance coverage, provides coverage to a qualified indi-
vidual (as defined in subsection (bj), the plan or issuer-
(A) may not deny the individual participation in the clinical trial referred
to in subsection (b)(2);
(B) subject to subsection (c), may not deny (or limit or impose additional
conditions on) the coverage of routine patient costs for items and services
furnished in connection with participation in the trial; and
(C) may not discriminate against the individual on the basis of the en-
rollee's participation in such trial.
(2) Exciusion of certain costs. For purposes of paragraph (1)(B), routine
patient costs do not include the cost of the tests or measurements con-
ducted primarily for the purpose of the clinical trial involved.
(3) Use of in-network providers. If one or more participating providers
is participating in a clinical trial, nothing in paragraph (1) shall be con-
strued as preventing a plan or issuer from requiring that a qualified individ-
ual participate in the trial through such a participating provider if the
provider will accept the individual as a participant in the trial.
(b) Qualified Individual Defined. For purposes of subsection (a), the term
"qualified individual" means an individual who is a participant or benefici-
ary in a group health plan, or who is an enrollee under health insurance
coverage, and who meets the following conditions:
(l)(A) The individual has a life-threatening or serious illness for which
no standard treatment is effective.
(B) The individual is eligible to participate in an approved clinical trial
according to the trial protocol with respect to treatment of such illness.
(C) The individual's participation in the trial offers meaningful potential
for significant clinical benefit for the individual.
(2) Either-
(A) the referring physician is a participating health care professional and
has concluded that the individual's participation in such trial would be ap-
propriate based upon the individual meeting the conditions described in
paragraph (1); or
(B) tbe participant, beneficiary, or enrollee provides medical and scien-
tific information establishing that the individual's participation in such trial
would be appropriate based upon the individual meeting the conditions
described in paragraph (1).
(0) Payment.
(1) In general. Under this section a group health plan or health insur-
ance issuer shall provide for payment for routine patient costs described in
subsection (a)(2) but is not required to pay for costs of items and services
that are reasonably expected (as determined by the Secretary) to be paid
for by the sponsors of an approved clinical trial.
(2) Payment rate. In the case of covered items and services provided
by~
(A) a participating provider, the payment rate shall be at the agreed
upon rate, or
(B) a nonparticipating provider, the payment rate shall be at the rate the
plan or issuer would normally pay for comparable services under subpara-
graph (A).
(d) Approved Clinical Trial Defined.
(1) In general. In this section, the term "approved clinical trial" means a
clinical research study or clinical investigation approved and funded (which
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pansive than the legislation proposed in this article. The Nor-
wood-Dingell Bill does not limit coverage to Phase III clinical
trials, but rather, applies to all clinical trials.F" Moreover, it
mandates reimbursement for any individual who has a "life-
threatening or serious illness for which no standard treatment is
effective."?" The term "serious illness" is not defined. In addi-
tion, the Norwood-Dingell Bill only requires that "[t]he individ-
ual's participation in the trial offer[] meaningful potential for
significant clinical benefit for the individual. "298 The terms
"meaningful potential" and "significant clinical benefit" are simi-
larly vague and ambiguous.
Like the HSA, the Norwood-Dingell Bill is lengthy and far-
reaching. Its purpose is to amend the Public Health Service Act,
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, and the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 "to protect consumers in man-
aged care plans and other health coverage."?" The issues it ad-
dresses include access to care, quality assurance, patient
information, grievance and appeals procedures, protecting the
doctor-patient relationship, and promoting good medical prac-
tice300 The Norwood-Dingell Bill is unlikely to pass in its pres-
ent form. Another bill, concurrently being considered in
Congress mandates coverage only for individuals participating in
may include funding through in-kind contributions) by one or more of the
following:
(A) The National Institutes of Health.
(B) A cooperative group or center of the National Institutes of Health.
(C) Either of the following if the conditions described in paragraph (2)
are met:
(i) The Department of Veterans Affairs.
(ii) The Department of Defense.
(2) Conditions for departments. The conditions described in this para~
graph, for a study or investigation conducted by a Department, are that the
study or investigation has been reviewed and approved through a system of
peer review that the Secretary determines-
(A) to be comparable to the system of peer review of studies and investi-
gations used by the National Institutes of Health, and
(B) assures unbiased review of the highest scientific standards by quali-
fied individuals who have no interest in the outcome of the review.
(e) Construction. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit a
plan's or issuer's coverage with respect to clinical trials.
296Id. § 119(a)(1).
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clinical trials for cancer treatment.'?' Consequently, even if
some healthcare reform statute is enacted in the coming year, it
is unlikely to provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of
health insurance coverage for experimental treatments.
V
THE PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A. Suggested Language for the Statute
The following is suggested legislative language for a federal
statute addressing coverage of experimental or investigational
treatments. The proposed legislation may be formulated as an
amendment to HIPAA, which addresses other coverage exclu-
sions.'?" Therefore, HIPAA's definitions and enforcement provi-
sions would be applicable to the new legislation.
SECTION 1. COVERAGE FOR PHASE III CLINICAL
TRIALS,03
(a) A group health plan, a health insurance issuer offering
group health insurance coverage in connection with a group
health plan, and a health insurance issuer that provides indi-
vidual health insurance coverage to an individual may not
deny coverage for a treatment on the ground that it is experi-
mental if the following circumstances are present:
(1) The beneficiary has a terminal condition that, according
to the beneficiary's physician's current diagnosis, has a high
probability of causing death within two years from the date
the request for coverage of an experimental treatment was
made;
(2) Treatment is being provided to the beneficiary pursuant
to a Phase III clinical trial that has been approved by an insti-
tutional review board;
(3) The facility and personnel providing the treatment are
qualified to do so by virtue of their experience, training, and
volume of patients treated by them;
(4) The beneficiary receiving the investigational treatment
meets all protocol requirements;
(5) There is no clearly superior, noninvestigational alterna-
tive to the protocol treatment; and
(6) The availa\,le clinical or preclinical data provides a rea-
sonable expectation that the protocol treatment will be at least
as efficacious as the noninvestigational alternative.
30J H.R. 3110, 106th Cong., Ist Sess, (1999). Coverage is required for all phases of
clinical trials.
302See discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
303 Based in large part on and borrowing language from R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 27- 18-
36.2 (1998).
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(b) Phase III clinical trials are defined in 21 C.F.R.
§ 312.21(c). However, for purpose of this Title Phase III
clinical trials shall mean not only studies testing a new drug or
device regulated by the FDA, but also those testing other
treatments, so long as they are subject to the regulations found
at 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 et seq.
(c) Coverage for the services required under this section
shall be provided subject to the terms and conditions generally
applicable to other benefits under the plan contract.
. (d) The informed consent documentation given to the pa-
trent shall clearly state that the treatment is experimental and
may reduce the patient's life expectancy or quality of life
rather than improve the individual's condition. In addition,
the informed consent must meet all of the requirements out-
lined in 45 C.F.R. § 46.116.
SECTION 2: OFF-LABEL DRUG USE,04
(a) No health insurer issuing a policy that provides cover-
age for prescription drugs shall exclude reimbursement for any
such drug on the grounds that the drug has not been approved
by the Food and Drug Administration for that indication (that
is, its use constitutes "off-label drug use") if the use of the
drug for the indication at issue is recognized in one of the stan-
dard reference compendia or in the medical literature, as de-
fined in subsection (c) below.
(b) Standard reference compendia shall mean: (1) the
United States Pharmacopeia Drug Information, (2) the Amer-
ican Medical Association Drug Evaluations, and (3) the
American Hospital Formulary Service Drug Information.
(c) Medical literature shall mean published scientific stud-
ies of off-label use of drugs appearing in any peer-reviewed
national professional journal.
(d) Coverage for the off-label use of a prescription drug re-
quired by this section shall include coverage of any medically
necessary services associated with the administration of the
prescription drug.
(e) If an insurer denies coverage for off-label drug use to a
beneficiary with a terminal illness that, according to the bene-
ficiary's physician's current diagnosis, has a high probability of
causing death within two years from the date of the request for
coverage, on the ground that the off-label drug use was expen-
mental and thus excluded from coverage under the plan, and
the off-label drug use was intended by the beneficiary's physi-
cian to treat the terminal illness, the patient may seek review
of the insurer's decision through the independent review pro-
cess established in Section 3. If a majority or exactly a half of
the expert panel recommends providing the requested drug
therapy, reimbursement for the treatment may not be denied
304 See Harness, supra note 69, at 96.
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to the beneficiary by the plan on the ground that it is
experimental.
SECTION 3: INDEPENDENT REVIEW PROCESS305
(a) Each group health plan, health insurance issuer offering
group health insurance coverage in connection with a group
health plan, and health insurance issuer that provides individ-
ual health insurance coverage to an individual shall provide an
external, independent review process to assess the pian's cov-
erage decisions regarding experimental or investigational ther-
apies for enrollees who meet all of the following criteria:
(1) The enrollee has a terminal condition that, according to
the enrollee's physician's current diagnosis, has a high
probability of causing death within two years from the date of
the request for coverage;
(2) The enrollee's physician certifies that the enrollee has a
condition, as defined in paragraph (1), for which standard
therapies have not been effective in improving the condition
of the enrollee, or for which standard therapies would not be
medically appropriate for the enrollee, or for which there is no
more beneficial standard therapy covered by the plan than the
therapy proposed pursuant to paragraph (3);
(3) The enrollee's physician has recommended that the en-
rollee receive treatment in a specific Phase 111clinical trial and
believes that all of the conditions delineated in Section 1
above have been met. The physician must certify in writing
that all the criteria described in Section 1 have been met and
explain why this is so.
(4) The enrollee has been denied coverage by the plan for
therapy provided in a Phase III clinical trial requested pursu-
ant to paragraph (3); and
(5) The therapy at issue would be a covered service, except
for the plan's determination that the therapy is experimental
or investigational.
(b) The enrollee shall not be required to pay for the exter-
nal, independent review. The cost of the review shall be borne
by the plan.
(c) The plan's external, independent review shall meet the
following criteria:
(1) The plan shall offer all enrollees who meet the criteria
in subsection (a) the opportunity to have the requested ther-
apy reviewed under the external, independent review process.
The plan shall notify eligible enrollees in writing of the oppor-
tunity to request the external independent review within five
days of the decision to deny coverage. Enrollees with a termi-
nal illness as defined in paragraph (a)(l) above may also re-
quest review of any decision by the plan to deny coverage for
off-label drug use to treat a terminal illness.
305Based upon and borrowing language from CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1370.4(West Supp.1999).
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(2) The plan shall contract with one or more impartial, in-
dependent entities that are accredited pursuant to subsection
(d). The entity shall arrange for review of the coverage deci-
sion by selecting an independent panel of at least three physi-
cians or other providers who are experts in the treatment of
the enrollee's medical condition and knowledgeable about the
recommended therapy. If the entity is an academic medical
center accredited in accordance with subsection (e), the in-
dependent panel may include experts affiliated with or em-
ployed by the entity. A panel of two experts may be arranged
at the plan's request, provided the enrollee consents in writ-
ing. The independent entity may arrange for a panel of one
expert only if the independent entity certifies in writing that
there is only one expert qualified and able to review the rec-
ommended therapy. Neither the plan nor the enrollee shall
choose or control the choice of the physician or other provider
experts.
(3) Neither the expert, nor the independent entity nor any
officer, director, or management employee of the independent
entity shall have any material professional, familial, or finan-
cial affiliation, as defined in paragraph (4), with any of the fol-
lowing: (A) the plan; (B) any officer, director, or management
employee of the plan; (C) the physician, the physician's medi-
cal group, or the independent practice association (IPA) pro-
posing the therapy; (D) the institution at which the therapy
would be provided; or (E) the developer or manufacturer of
the drug, device, procedure or other therapy proposed for use
in the Phase III clinical trial at issue.
(4) For purposes of this section, the following terms shall
have the following meanings:
(A) "Material familial affiliation" means a relationship as a
spouse, child, parent, sibling, spouse's parent, or child's
spouse.
(B) "Material professional affiliation" means a physician-
patient relationship, a partnership or employment relation-
ship, a shareholder or ownership interest in a professional cor-
poration, or any independent contractor arrangement that
constitutes a material financial affiliation with any expert or
any officer or director of the independent entity. The term
"material professional affiliation" shall not include a.ffiliations
which are limited to staff privileges at a health facility.
(C) "Material financial affiliation" means any financial in-
terest of more than 5 percent of total annual revenue or t~t~l
annual income of an entity or individual to which this s,ubdIVl-
sion applies. "Material financial affiliation" does not include
payment by the plan to the independent entity for the services
required by this section, or an expert's participa~on as a con-
tracting plan provider where the expert is affiliated With ~n
academic medical center or a National Cancer InstItute-desig-
nated clinical cancer research center.
(5) The plan shall provide to the independent entity arrang-
....
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ing for the panel of experts a copy of the following documents
within five business days of the plan's receipt of a request by
an enrollee or enrollee's physician for an external, independ-
ent review:
(A) The medical records in the plan's possession that are
relevant to the patient's condition for which the proposed
therapy has been recommended.. Any. additio~al medical
records provided to the plan after Its initial submission to the
independent entity shall be forwarded by the plan to the in-
dependent entity within five business days. The records shall
remain confidential and not be disclosed to any third parties
other than the selected experts.
(B) A copy of any documents used by the plan in determin-
ing whether the proposed therapy should be covered and any
documents explaining the reasons for the plan's denial of cov-
erage. This data includes any information submitted by the
patient or the patient's physician in support of the request for
coverage of treatment provided in an appropriate Phase III
clinical trial or off-label drug use.
(6) The experts on the panel shall render their analyses and
recommendations within thirty days of the receipt of the en-
rollee's request for review. If the enrollee's physician deter-
mines that the effectiveness of the proposed therapy would be
significantly diminished if not promptly commenced, the anal-
yses and recommendations of the experts on the panel shall be
rendered within seven days of the request for expedited re-
view. At the request of the experts, the deadline shall be ex-
tended by up to three days for a delay in providing the
documents required by paragraph (5) of subsection (c).
(7) Each expert's analysis and recommendation shall be in
writing and shall explain the reasons for the expert's recom-
mendation in support of or in opposition to the coverage of
the treatment in question. The written statement shall cite the
enrollee's specific medical condition, the relevant documents
provided pursuant to paragraph (5), and the relevant medical
and scientific evidence that supports the expert's
recommendation.
(8) The independent entity shall provide the plan and the
enrollee's physician with the experts' analyses and recommen-
dations, a description of the qualifications of each expert, and
any other information that it chooses to provide to the plan
and the enrollee's physician. The independent entity may dis-
close the identities of the experts to the plan at its discretion,
and if it does so, it must disclose the names of the experts to
the enrollee's physician.
(9) If the majority of experts on the panel recommend pro-
viding the proposed therapy, the recommendation shall be
binding on the plan. If there are only two experts on the panel
and their recommendations are evenly divided, then the
panel's decision shall be deemed to be in favor of coverage. If
less than a majority of the experts on the panel recommend
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providing the requested therapy, the plan is not required to
reimburse the patient for the treatment.
(10) The plan shall h~ve written policies describing the ex-
ternal, independent review process. The plan shall disclose
the availability of the external, independent review process
and how enrollees may access the review process in the plan's
evidence of coverage and disclosure forms. This requirement
is in addition to the enrollee notification requirement estab-
lished in subsection (c)(l) above.
(d) The Insurance Commissioner of each state shall con-
tract with a private, nonprofit accrediting organization to ac-
credit the independent entities described in paragraph (c)(2).
The accrediting organization shall have the power to grant and
revoke accreditation, and shall develop, apply, and enforce ac-
creditation standards, including those required in subsection
(e), that ensure the independence of the entity, the confidenti-
ality of the medical records, and the qualifications and inde-
pendence of the health care professionals providing the
analyses and recommendations requested of them. The ac-
crediting organization shall demonstrate the ability to objec-
tively evaluate the performance of independent entities and
shall demonstrate that it has no conflict of interest, including
any material professional, familial, or financial affiliation as
defined in paragraph (4) of subsection (c) with any independ-
ent entity or plan, in accrediting entities for the purpose of
reviewing medical treatments, treatment recommendations,
and coverage decisions by health care plans.
(e) In order to receive accreditation for the purposes of this
section, an independent entity must be an organization that
has as its primary function to provide expert reviews and re-
lated services and receives a majority of its revenues from
these services. However, an academic medical center may
qualify as an independent entity for purposes of this Act with-
out having as its primary function providing expert reviews
and related services and without receiving a majority of its
revenues from these services. An independent entity may not
be a subsidiary of, nor in any way owned or controlled by, a
health plan, a trade association of health plans, or a profes-
sional association of health care providers.
SECTION 4. EFFECT ON STATE LAWS.
This title shall not be construed to supersede any provision
of state law that establishes, implements, or con~inuesin effect
any standard or requirement relating to health msur~nce cov-
e.rag~for a particular experimental treatment or specificmves-
ugational therapies except to the extent that su.chstandard or
requirement prevents the application of a reqUirement of this
title.
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B, Further Justification for the Proposed Federal Legislation
1, Coverage for Phase III Clinical Trials
A federal mandate requiring insurers to reimburse patients
with terminal illnesses for treatments received in an appropriate
Phase III clinical trial is a moderate and prudent solution to the
problem of coverage exclusions for experimental treatments, As
set forth below, the new reimbursement requirement will likely
save patient lives, will not be exorbitantly expensive for insurers,
and will encourage research and expedited identification of safe
and effective therapies,
The proposed statute mandates coverage for experimental
treatments in a narrowly defined set of circumstances, The pa-
tient must have a terminal condition that, according to his or her
physician, has a high probability of causing death within two
years, The proposed statute thus endeavors to aid only the sick-
est of patients and to offer them opportunities to receive last-
chance, potentially life-saving treatments,
Furthermore, only Phase III clinical trials are covered, These
generally constitute the final stage of testing and are the clinical
trials that are most likely to provide beneficial treatment for the
patient.'?" Seventy percent of drugs submitted for Phase I
clinical trials fail at that level of testing and thirty three percent
of those that advance to Phase II clinical trials fail at the second
stage of testing."? The treatments that reach Phase III trials
have already survived rigorous scrutiny, In addition, some com-
mentators have noted that only three to five percent of cancer
patients are referred by their physicians to clinical trials.?" This
is due in part to the stringent protocol criteria of many clinical
trials and to physician resistance to experimental treatment,
among other factors.t??
Insurers would not bear the entire burden of paying for treat-
ment provided in Phase III clinical trials, Rather, expenses for
clinical research are paid by a variety of sources.v" These in-
306 Henry, supra note 74, at 621.
307 u.
308 VANDERPOOL, supra note 181, at 331; Susan Okie, Shying Away from the Cut-
ting Edge; Shortage of Patients in Clinical Trials Inhibits Cancer Research, Study
Says, WASH: POST, June 1, ~999, at ~07 (discussing a new survey released at the
annual meetmg of the Amencan Society for Clinical Oncology in May of 1999).
309 Okie, supra note 308.
310 VANDERPOOL, supra note 181, at ] 93.
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elude for-profit institutions such as manufacturers of drugs and
medical devices or for-profit hospitals and treatment centers as
well as nonprofit entities such as the National Institutes of
Health, the American Hospital Association, the American Can-
cer Society, universities, and medical centers.'!'
The Department of Health and Human Services, for example,
awards approximately $5.5 billion per year for research involving
human subjects.F' and in 1993 the National Institutes of Health
granted the United States' 127 medical schools $3.9 billion for
research for approximately 15,240 protocols, though not all in-
volved human subjects.":' If the clinical trial involves an investi-
gational drug, a sponsor may not charge participants without
obtaining prior approval by the FDA. To obtain approval, the
sponsor must submit a detailed explanation of why it cannot ab-
sorb all expenses as a "normal cost of doing business. "314 Conse-
quently, insurers would merely supplement funding that would
often be available from other sources.
Denials of coverage for individuals with life-threatening dis-
eases may save insurers money in the short term but are some-
times costly in the long run, since they often generate intensely
adverse publicity and extremely expensive litigation.'15 In 1991,
for example, 60 Minutes featured a story about Aetna Insurance
Co. refusing coverage for treatment of a breast cancer patient by
a bone marrow transplant.V" Many similar stories have fol-
lowed. As a result, some insurers opt to pay for controversial
treatments instead of risking the consequences of a denial."?
311 [d. at 193-194.
312 Id. at 11.
313 Id. at 12.
31421 C.F.R. § 312.7(d)(1) (1999). The regulation states:
Charging for an investigational drug in a clinical trial under an IND is not
permitted without the prior written approval of FDA. In requesting such
approval, the sponsor shall provide a full written explanation of why charg-
ing is necessary in order for the sponsor to undertake or continue the
clinical trial, e.g. why distribution of the drug to test subjects should not be
considered part of the normal cost of doing business.
[d.
315 Daniels & Sabin, supra note 48, at 27~28.
316Id. at 29.
317 See, e.g., L.M. Sixel, Insurance Plans Will Cover Therapy for Breast Cancer,
HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 17, 1998, at 1C (reporting that several employers reached
an agreement with the Houston District Office of the Equal Employment (jpportu-
nity Commission to reimburse enrollees for treatment of breast cancer by HDC~
ABMT).
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On September 20, 1994 the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) issued a directive requiring the 350 health plans serving
approximately nine million federal employees and their depen-
dents to cover treatment by HDC-ABMT for breast cancer, mul-
tiple myeloma, and epithelial ovarian cancer in clinical trials.l'"
Providers maintain some discretion in that they may limit cover-
age of randomized clinical trials to those conducted at designated
facilities."? Some commentators attribute OPM's directive to
public pressure."?
The proposed federal legislation may in reality save insurers
significant costs. Health plans will be less vulnerable to liability
if they deny coverage for experimental treatments that are not
provided within the framework of a qualified Phase III clinical
triaL321 The plans will be required to reimburse patients only in
the limited circumstances delineated above.Y' The clear legisla-
tive mandate should serve as an effective defense in case of litiga-
tion involving reimbursement for other experimental therapies.
Federal legislation compelling coverage of treatment provided
in clinical trials will benefit not only patients and insurers, but
also medical research. Patients who cannot receive reimburse-
ment for experimental treatments, and who do not have their
own financial resources, are effectively barred from participation
in clinical trials. This results in many patients being excluded
from the participant population upon which medical research can
draw. The American Society for Clinical Oncology recently re-
ported that no more than five percent of adult cancer patients in
the United States are enrolled in research studies.F' More lib-
eral coverage provisions will significantly increase the number
and diversity of patients available for biomedical experimenta-
tion in Phase III clinical trials. Similarly, scholars have criticized
318 Harness, supra note 69, at 92.
319 Wolf, supra note 30, at 2103.
320Voigt & Conlon, supra note 90, at 401.
321That is, unless state law or their own policy language compels such coverage.
322.Some may fear that mandatory coverage for experimental treatments provided
in Phase III clinical trials may soon lead to further legislative mandates regarding
coverage of Phase I and Phase II clinical trials. Experience has shown that nar-
rowly-tailored statutory requirements at the state level have not Jed to a deluge of
additional legislation regarding reimbursement for experimental treatments. More-
over, if more expansive and less reasonable legislation were to be proposed, the
insurance industry would have ample opportunity to lobby Congress, work with the
media, and build public support to defeat such legislation.
323 Okie, supra note 308.
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state legislation that establishes absolute coverage mandates for
experimental treatment as hindering scientific research.P" Pa-
tients who know that reimbursement is available for HDC-
ABMT provided to a breast cancer patient by any doctor at any
facility will have little incentive to seek and participate in clinical
trials from which important data would be collected.f" Rather,
patients are likely to have the procedure performed by their local
physician at the most conveniently accessible medical facility,
even if the facility is providing the treatment without conducting
a formal clinical tria!.326
Some insurers are themselves committed to advancing medical
research. At least one insurance provider has volunteered to
contribute substantial funds to Phase III clinical trials for the
purpose of establishing the efficacy of HDC-ABMT for breast
cancer patients. The Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans have con-
tributed approximately forty million dollars to randomized, con-
trolled clinical trials conducted over a five year period ending in
1998.327 The "Demonstration Project," conducted in conjunction
with the National Cancer Institute, supported a series of four na-
tional Phase III trials, involving approximately 1500 women.?"
The trials were conducted at eighty-six medical research facili-
ties, and Blue Cross Blue Shield Association had contracts with
forty-two of these entities.'29 Insurers paying for Phase III
clinical trials not only provide potentially life-saving treatment
324Daniels & Sabin. supra note 48, at 31 ("[M]andates would make It impossible
to continue proper clinical trials aimed at assessing efficacy [of treatment]."); see
also Saver, supra note 2, at 1130 (referring to the "'chilling effect' on development
and study of new technologies").
325 See sources cited supra note 322.
326 Not all experimental treatment is subject to federal regulations which require
IRB review and formal clinical trials. 45 c'F.R. § 46.116 (1998). Therefore, some
patients will be able to find physicians who provide the procedure without con-
ducting a research study. See High-Dose Chemotherapy, supra note 45, at 119
("[R]esearch examining HDC's potential in breast cancer has been hindered by the
~actthat the overwhelming majority of women who have undergone t~eprocedure
m the United States have done so outside of clinical trials."); see also Gina Kalata &
Kurt Eichenwald, Hope for Sale: A Special Report; Business Thrive,~on Unproven
Care, Leaving Science Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1999, at Al ( An mcreasmg
number of untested treatments are being sold to desperate patients With ailments
like cancer, heart failure and Parkinson's disease. Today, experimental procedures
can be purchased outright from community hospitals. university medical centers and
even from publicly traded companies.").
327 Ader, supra note 26, at 57-58.
328 [d.
329 [d.
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for their enrollees, but also promote research that will either ulti-
mately establish the therapy as safe and effective or prove that it
is not beneficial for patients and thus eliminate future contro-
versy and expense relating to the treatment.
It is important to note that one serious ethical problem may be
raised by the proposed legislation. Patients who enroll in Phase
III randomized clinical trials risk being placed in a control group
that does not receive the investigational treatment.F" The ethi-
cal dilemma of using placebos in clinical trials or placing patients
in control groups that do not undergo the potentially life-saving
procedure has generated much discussion among scholars and is
beyond the scope of this paper. Researchers often implement
mechanisms that will ensure that most if not all participants will
benefit from clinical trials.?" Moreover, many Phase III clinical
trials compare the experimental treatment to standard ther-
apy,'32 and thus patients in the control group receive traditional
treatments and are no worse off than those who do not enroll in a
clinical trial. In addition, IRBs must review and approve all re-
search protocols after careful consideration of the risks and ben-
efits inherent in the clinical study.P:' IREs, presumably, would
330 Saver, supra note 2, at 1130.
331 See id. at 1130 n.198 (suggesting that "where possible, the new treatment could
be compared to data from other trials or to historical controls"); see also BARUCH
A. BRODY, ETHICAL ISSUES IN DRUG TESTiNG, ApPROVAL, AND PRlCTNG 124
(1995). Brody suggests the following:
[1]t is ethical to withhold from a control group a therapy that has not yet
been formally approved but that has been shown in one or more trials to be
effective and safe, even if the subjects in the placebo control group are
thereby exposed to a greater risk of long-term losses, only if those losses
and the probabilities of their occurring are sufficiently small that (1) the
subject, informed of all of this, freely consents to being randomized into
the trial and (2) reasonable people, of an average degree of altruism and
risk-aversiveness, informed of all this, might consent to being randomized
into the trial.
td.: see also Carol Gentry, Second Opinion Why Medicare Covers A New Lung Sur-
gery For lust a Few Patients, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1998, at AI. The article reports
that Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Massachusetts in conjunction with other insurers
and medical centers in the state, is conducting a clinical trial designed to test the
efficacy of a surgical procedure known as lung-volume reduction to treat emphy-
sema. The study will utilize a control group, but patients will be able to cross over
and undergo the surgery after just six months, rather than five years, as is the case in
other clinical trials.
332Dahl-Eimers v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 812 F. Supp. 1193, 1196 (N.D.
Fla. 1992).
33345 C.F.R. § 46.111 (1998).
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not allow research to proceed if it will compromise the health of
gravely ill participants.
2. Coverage of Off-label Drug Use
Physicians commonly find that insurers deny their patients re-
imbursement for off-label drug use. One study of off-label treat-
ments in oncology found that nearly half of the 680 physicians
who were questioned reported that an insurer had denied cover-
age for treatment by use of off-label drugs.P" Recent bills intro-
duced in many state legislatures attempt to remedy this problem
by requiring managed care providers to cover off-label uses in
some circumstances.F" As early as 1993, New Jersey passed a
law that requires most insurers to pay for medically appropriate
uses of off-label drugs.P? In order to qualify as medically appro-
priate, the therapy must be recognized in the American Medical
Association Drug Evaluations, the American Hospital Formulary
Service Drug Information, or the United States Pharmacopeia
Drug Information."? In addition, "an off-label use is medically
appropriate [under the New Jersey law] if it has been recom-
mended by a clinical study or review article in a major peer-re-
viewed professional journal."?"
The proposed federal statute likewise mandates that insurers
provide reimbursement for off-label drug use so long as the use is
recognized in one of the standard reference compendia or in a
national, peer-reviewed professional journal. The American
Medical Association Drug Evaluations explicitly addresses the is-
sue of off-label drug uses in its preface. It states the following:
The indications cited in official labeling for a drug are limited
to those that are approved by the FDA for purpos~s of ma~-
keting or advertising. The labeling does not constram a physi-
cian's use of the drug for an unlabeled indication in individual
patients so long as that use is based on rational scientific eVI-
dence or theory, expert medical judgment, or controlled
334GAO REpORT, supra note 63, at 28, 42.
335Edmund Polubinski Ill, Note, Closing the Channels of Communication: A First
Amendment Analysis of the FDA's Policy on Manufacturer Promotion of "Off~La·
bel" Use, 83 VA. L. REV. 991, 1030 n.235 (1997); see also States Move Multiple
Healthcare Bills in Fledgling Legislative Session, HEALTH LEGiS. & REo. WKLY.,
Mar. 26, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8740227, at *l.
3361993 N.J. Sess. Law Servo 321 (West); see also Off-Lobel Uses of FDA-Ap-
proved Drugs May Help Contain Health Care Costs in New Jersey, 6 Loy. CON"
SUMER L. REp. 88 (1994) [hereinafter Off-Label Uses].
337 See Off-Label Uses, supra note 336.
338 Td.
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clinical studies. Therefore, because indications approved for
labeling by the FDA often lag behind both the world literature
and medical practice or because the manufacturer has not sub-
mitted an application for a new use, both labeled and unla-
beled (off-label) uses of drugs are evaluated in DE .339
The proposed legislation does not limit the reimbursement re-
quirement to drugs used to treat patients with terminal illnesses
since off-label drug use is prevalent in the medical profession.'?"
For terminally ill patients who are declined coverage for off-
label drug use intended to treat their terminal illness, the statute
establishes the option of an independent review process. By ma-
jority vote, the reviewing panel of experts can require the insurer
to cover the potentially life-saving therapy. Because so much is
at stake for terminally ill patients, an external expert review of
coverage denials for off-label drug use is a responsible and pru-
dent way to resolve disputes quickly and avoid costly litigation.
The independent review process is discussed below.
3. The Independent Review Process
The proposed federal statute attempts to set clear guidelines
for insurers regarding reimbursement for investigational thera-
pies and to reduce dramatically the controversy surrounding the
issue of coverage exclusions for experimental treatments. Never-
theless, even the most carefully drafted statutory language will
leave room for debate as to whether a particular patient is cov-
ered under specific circumstances. The recommended federal
legislation, for example, leaves open the following issues:
1) Are the facility and personnel providing the proposed
treatment qualified to do so by virtue of their experience and
training?
2) Does the patient meet all protocol requirements?
3) Is there a clearly superior, noninvestigational treatment
available to the enrollee?
4) Is th~re a reasonable expectation that the protocol treat-
ment Will be at least as beneficial to the patient as the
nonexperimental alternative?
5) Insurers will continue to be free to define the term "experi-
mental or investigational treatment" as they see fit. If the
tr~at.ment unde~ ~onsid~;ation for a terminally ill patient fits
~lthm th~ definition of experimental or investigational," the
msurer WIllhave to pay for the therapy only if an appropriate
Phase III clinical trial is found for the enrollee. If the treat-
339 AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, AMA DRUG EVALUATIONS ANNUAL 1995, at iii-iv.
340 See Harness, supra note 69, at 96.
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m.ent is not de~med experimen~al or investigational, the plan
will have to rennburse the patient for Its cost in accordance
with plan policy. Controversies are likely to continue to
abound regarding whether procedures such as HDC-
ABMT341 or lung-volume reductions342 constitute investiga-
tional or standard therapy at any given point in time, since
determinations regarding their status dictate the insurer's re-
imbursement obligations.
6) The insured's physician may be unable to determine
whether the patient's illness has a high probability of causing
death within two years, thereby obfuscating the issue of
whether the individual falls within the purview of the statute.
All of the questions listed above provide a potential basis for
insurers to deny coverage for treatment provided to terminally ill
patients in Phase III clinical trials. It is for this reason that the
proposed statute establishes an independent review mechanism
for adverse coverage decisions, designed to resolve coverage dis-
putes in an effective and expedited fashion without resort to the
media or the courts.
Some congressional legislators have already recognized the
utility of independent review panels. One proposed bill, entitled
"Health Care Quality and Choice Act of 1999,"343 establishes
that individuals denied care or coverage by their group health
plan or health insurance issuer could demand first an internal re-
view and then a review by an independent panel of experts
outside the health plan.?"
Similarly, the Norwood-Dingell Bill features an independent
appeal mechanism, available after exhaustion of an internal ap-
peal proccss.r" The appeal would be available to any patient
whose claim was denied based on a decision that "the item or
service is not medically necessary or appropriate or is investiga-
tional or experimental" or that involves a medical [udgment.t"
The Norwood-Dingell plan would, therefore, provide much
broader appeal rights and be far more costly for insurers than the
legislation proposed in this Article.
Many state legislatures have already mandated that HMOs al-
low patients to challenge denials of benefits by submitting an ap-
341 See supra Part LA,
342 See Gentry, supra note 331, at At.
343 H.R. 2824, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
344!d. §§ 102 and 103.
345 H.R. 2723, l06th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 102 and 103 (1999).
3461d. § 103(a)(2)(A)(i).
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peal to an independent panel of medical experts.r'" Of the
approximately twenty states that require independent reviews of
negative coverage decisions, six adopted the external appeals
laws in 1998.348 These states include Hawaii, Maryland, New
York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Vermont.
At first blush, the independent review process may appear to
impose exorbitant costs upon insurers. Further scrutiny of the
mechanism, however, will show that its costs should be modest.
Each health plan is obligated initially only to contract with an
impartial, independent entity responsible for arranging the ex-
pert panel reviews of coverage denials whenever necessary. This
contract can be arranged for a nominal flat fee with further pay-
ments triggered only by actual reviews of coverage decisions.
Only patients with terminal conditions who are likely to die
within two years are entitled to seek expert panel reviews. Fur-
thermore, the experience of Northern California Kaiser
Permanente and the State of Texas suggest that given the option
of appeal to an independent review panel, patients may feel
greater trust for their insurer's judgment and rarely invoke the
appeal process.>" It is also possible that insurers will engage in a
more thorough, diligent decision-making process, knowing that
an irresponsible coverage denial may trigger an expensive expert
review,
The independent review process provides a private forum for
the resolution of coverage disputes regarding terminally ill pa-
tients, outside the glare of the media and open court hearings.
An independent review of a coverage denial will surely be less
expensive for the insurer than litigation regarding the case. Most
importantly, coverage disputes will be resolved within a month,
and at times as quickly as seven days. The swift resolutions will
benefit both the insurer, who will not need to invest significant
time and resources in the dispute, and the patient, who will be
spared an agonizing wait for an answer regarding potentially life-
saving treatments.
Patients who are still dissatisfied after the independent review
panel renders its decision will not be prevented by the statute
347Robert Pear, States Take Lead in Health Legislation, N.Y. TLMES, Sept. 14,
1998, at A12.
348 ld.; see also Molly Tschida, Bridging the Gap: Court Decisions Clear Path for
HMO Liability, MODERN PHYSICIAN, June I, 1999, at 50.
349Daniels & Sabin, supra note 48, at 33-34.
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from turning to the courts. The insurer, however, may nonethe-
less benefit from having utilized the review process. Courts are
likely to give deference to the expert panel's determination and
to credit insurers for the use of fair procedural safeguards in the
decision-making process.F"
CONCLUSION
The problem of coverage denials for last-chance experimental
treatments has received increasing attention in the media and the
courts in recent years. One cannot ignore the plight of desper-
ately ill patients who are aware of a potential cure, but know that
it is unavailable to them because of a health insurance coverage
exclusion. The judiciary and state legislatures alike have grap-
pled with the problem, but both are imperfect forums for resolu-
tion of the issue.
Federal legislation that is specific and narrowly tailored, as
proposed here, offers the best response to the problem of insur-
ance coverage for experimental treatment. The new require-
ments may increase costs for insurers in the short term, but these
costs are not expected to be overwhelming. It may be advisable
for each state's insurance commissioner to require insurers to
submit annual reports regarding the costs incurred as a direct re-
sult of the federal legislative reforms. The financial impact of the
mandated benefits could then be assessed in light of objective
data.
The proposed statute strives to protect only the sickest of pa-
tients, who are in need of truly life-saving, last-chance treat-
ments. It does not ignore the needs of insurers, who have limited
resources and whose financial integrity is at stake. In addition,
the statute does not respond to any particular lobby or advocacy
group, but rather, addresses coverage of experimental therapies
that might be sought by any terminally ill patient. While no solu-
tion to such an emotionally charged, complex problem can be
flawless, the proposal outlined in this Article is likely to promote
the welfare of all concerned parties including patients, insurers,
and the general public, who will benefit from legislative support
for clinical research and the expedited development of safe and
effective treatments for life-threatening diseases.
350 Id. at 39.
